University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1994

The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

Repository Citation
Fisch, Jill E., "The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur" (1994). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law.
1329.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1329

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Jill E. Fisch*
I was sittmg m my office, debating whe ther to get a second
cup of coffee before preparing for d ass, when the re was a knock
at the d oor. I answered warily, anticipating yet ano ther student
who wanted me to "explain" why he or she had d one poorly on
the exam. Although the face at the door was vag"uely familia r, it
did not belong to one of my students.
"Rodrigo?" 1 I asked h esitan tly. I could think of n o reason why
Rodrigo would be coming to see me and wondered hovt he could
have b ecom e so confused as to be not only at the wrong
professor's office, but at the wrong law school. 2
"I se e you are acquainted ·with my brother," the visitor replied . "I am often mistaken for him as he is, of course, so well
known among legal academics. I am Eduardo."
''I' m pleased to meet you, Eduardo. I did n't realize there was
* Associate Professor, Fordham University Sc hool of Law. B.A., Co rnell University,
1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am indebted to Richard Delgado and Bill Eskridge
for th ei r development and analysis o f th e narrative form a nd for inspiring me to direct
the use of narrative to a nontraditional se ttin g-tradition al doctrinal sc holarship. This
articl e is, however, not the first to em ploy the dialogic me th od to explo re th e subject of
fe de ral courts. See Henry H art, The Power of Congress to Lhnit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953). Thanks are due to Marc
Arkin, Mike Gerhardt, Dan Richman, Tony Sebok, Steve The!, Bill Treanor, and my
mother for their helpful comments on earlie r drafts and to Ri chard Delgado both for his
comments an d for permission to use the Crenshaw fam ily pe rsonae.
1 Rodrigo is the fi ction al interlocutor and title cha racte r in th e Rodrigo Chronicles,
a se ries of na n·ative essays by Professo r Richard Delgado. See Richard Delgado, Rod1igo's
Chronicle, 101 YALE LJ. 1357 (1992); Richard Delgado , Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Ear
nomics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 11 83 (1993); Richard Delgado, &drigo's Third
Chronicle: Care, Competition, an d the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 8 1 CAL. L. REV. 387 (1 993)
[h ereinafte r Delgado, &drigo 's Third Chronicle]; Ric hard Delgado, &drigo 's Fourth Chronicle:
Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L REv. 1133 ( 1993); Ric ha rd
Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 158 1 ( 1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fifth Chron icle]; Richa rd Delgado, &d1igo 's
Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dile-m ma of Social Refonn, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639
( 1993); Richard Delgado, Rod1igo 's Seventh Chmnicie: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41
UCLA L. REv. 721 ( 1994) ; Richard Delgado , Rodrigo 's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, vVh ite
Fears-On the Social Constmction of Threat, 80 VA . L REV. 503 (1994) [hereinafte r Delgado,
P.odrigo 's Eighth Chronicle].
2 The Professo r, th e ques tione r in th e Rodrigo dialogues, is also a fi ctional character, described as "a man of color teach in g in a law school located in a large P...merican
city . . . ." Delgado , &drigo's Eighth Chronic!.e, stt,bra n ote l, at 504 n.3.
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another member of the Crenshaw family. 3 What brings you h ere?"
"Rodrigo suggested I seek you out. I have a p roblem and
could use your advice. "
''You must b e rmsta.
• k1ng
'
J:
C
j...,
me 10r
th e p rmessor.
1 !.ave
n o expertise in critical race theor1 or jurisprudence," I caution ed. 4
Eduardo smiled. "l'-Jow you must be mistaking me for my
brother. Mthough I to o am a lawyer, I am not an academic. I
practice iaw with the Legal Services Housing Project. My office is
right down the street. But my question is not about landlo rd-tenant law. I understand you have some expertise on the su bj ect of
vacatur."
I acknowledged tha t I had written on the subject. 5
"An in teresting problem has arisen in connection v-rith my
representation of tenants in condemned buildings. I'd like your
reaction. May I take a few minutes of your time?" 6
T

3 Eduardo and Rodrigo are half b.rothers of Geneva Crenshaw, the fictional activist
civil rights attorney described in DERRJCK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSNE
QUEST FOR R-\CL'\L JUSTICE ( 1987). For personal background on Rodrigo , see Delgado,
Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1, at 387 n.l. Like his siblings, Eduardo is a fictional
composite, reflecting concerns and observations expressed to me over the P<'-'t several
years in connection with my work on vacatur.
4 Rodrigo's discussions with the Professor have focused on critical race theory. In
the past, the narrative form has been used primarily by nontraditional legal scholars
speaking as outsiders to standard legal norms. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN . L. REv. 607, 608-09 (1994) (recounting examples and typical subject areas
of narrative scholarship). For further reflections on the role of narrative in legal scholarship, see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Nmrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411 ( 1989); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of
Dimitri Yurasov: Further &j?ections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994);
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sheri)', Telling St01ies out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
5 See Jill E. Fisch, Captive Cowts: The Destr11ction of Judicial Decisions by Ag•eemmt of the
Parties, 2 N.Y.U. Ei\'VTL. LJ. 191 (1993) [hereinafter Fisch, Captive Courts] (analyzing use
of vacatur and related processes to destroy environmental Jaw decisions); Jill E. Fisch,
F.eurriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589 ( 1991) [hereinafter Fisch, Rewriting History] (using economic
analysis to examine process of post-trial settlement and vacatur). In the interests of full
disclosure , I also informed Eduardo that I had written two briefs as Punicus Curiae to the
U.S. Supreme Court on the propriety of rules permitting routine vacatur o f cases settled
during the app ellate process. See Brie f of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
in Support of Pe titioner, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Y~isha v. United States Philips
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123); Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, P.C. in Support of Respondent, United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Pa rtnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. C t. 681 (1994)
(No. 93-714).
5 Eduardo shares his bro ther's a ppreciation for the utility of dialogue as a form of
a nalysis, see, e.g., Delgado, Rndrigo's Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 531, to such a d egree
that h e is willing to take the tool beyond its traditional role as a means of adding out-
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"Of course," I re p lied . "\Vould you like some coffee while we
talk? I'm afraid I can't offer you the Professor's esp:resso, 7 but our
faculty lounge has a serviceable coffee machine ."
"I'd love some coffee, thank you. Black, please."
We settled back with matching mugs of strong black coffee,
and Eduardo began to recount his story.
l.

DEFENDING THE HOMELESS O R HOW
EDUARDO ENCOUNTERS VACATUR

"For the past two years," Eduardo explain ed, "my office has
been involved in litigation on behalf of a group of homeless tenants wh o are living in a condemned apartment building. In defe nding the tenants against govern ment action, ..,,;e have argued
that the te n ants, although squ atters, have various privacy and property rights in their h ousing that the government must respect." 8
"Didn't I read something about this case in the Times?"
"Probably. Last summer we went to trial in the Southern Dis··
trict, and the court found in favor of our clients. The case was a
significant victory for the homeless and was prominently mentioned in the press."

sider perspectives and social commen~ry and exte nd it to more traditional legal analys is.
Eduardo's insight is not unprecedented. Legal scholars have valued th e dialogic form for
hundreds of yea rs. See, e.g., PLA.TO, THE REPL' BLIC (F. Co rnfeld tra ns. 1945) (describing
Socrates' use of dialogic questio ning). Indeed, Socratic questioning rem ains the dominant
educational method e mployed by America n law schools.
7 In kee ping with the Professor's urbane image, his office contains such accoutrements as a compact refrigerator and a machin e that grinds beans and prepares freshlymade espresso. See, e.g. , De lgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1, a t 388. One commenta tor has read these possessions to indicate that the Professo r has "sold out." See
Ric hard Posner, Legal Scholarship and Disciplinary• Politics: Discussion, 45 STAN. L. REV. 167 1,
1680 (1993).
8 The litigation described by Ed ua rdo is ficti onal although both the su bject m a tter
a nd the vaca tur issue are based on events th at have occurred in real litigation. See, e.g.,
Man~ne H owe, Squ atters Brace as City Focuses on East 13th StTeet, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994,
§ 13, at 5 (discussing City's efforts to evict long-term squatters from city-owned buildings). For a gene ral discussion of litigatio n on behalf of the right of the homeless to live
on public property, see Andrea Sachs, A Right to Sleep Outside ?, 79 A. B.A. ].. Aug. 1993, at
38. For an example of a n atte mpt to use vacatur to remove precede nts important to
public inte res t litigation , see J o int Mo ti on to Grant the Petitions for a \Vrit of Certiorari,
Vacate th e J udgment of the Court of Appeals, and Remand with Direc tions to Vacate the
J udgment of th e Distri ct Co u rt an d to Remand th e Case to the District Cou n for Consideration of the Parties' Settlement Agreemen t, Shalala v. Sc hoolcraft, 11 4 S. Ct. 902
(1994) (Nos. 92-1 392, 92-1395) [hereinafter J o int Mo tion , Schoo!crajl] (requestin g Court to
vacate lowe r cou rt decision u pholdin g jurisdi ction of fede ral co urts to re,~ ew manner in
which government evaluated claims for disability benefits); see olso S<:hoolcr<:>.ft v. Sullivan,
97 1 F.2d 81 (8th Ci r. 1992).
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"If your litigation was successful, what is the problem? Is the
city refusing to comply with the terms of the decision?"
"Not at all," Eduardo replied. "In fact, follmving the trial
court decision, various government o fficials met wi th us and
worked out housing
p" lacements for the tenants. O ur dients are no
u
longer squatters, and the case has become moo t. 9 I think the
government was concerned, especially in an electio n year, about
the publicit'j generated by the decision. The housing offici a ls wanted us to acknowledge publicly that the tenants' h ousin g problem
had been addressed, which we did."
"It sou n ds as if you were able to reach a so!u tion that met
everyone's needs, " I observed.
"It seemed that way to me as well. But apparen tly the government does not fed that it can iive with the trial co urt decision .
The privacy rights established by our case would require the government to change its policies for treatment of the homeless in a
nu m ber of d ifferent ways. Although it provided our clients with
appropriate housing, the government simultaneou sly fil ed a notice
of appeal. Now the government lawyers have approached me and
asked if we will agree to settle the case and move to have the trial
court decision vacated. I'm not sure I understand what the significance of vacatur would be or why, if the case is moot, either settlement or vacatur is necessary."

H.

MAKING DECISIONS DISAPPEAR OR HOW EDUA.WO
LEARNS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VACATUR

''I'm not surprised at your lack of familiar ity with the practice
of postsettlement vacatur," I said. "Until several years ago,
postsettlement vacatur was virtually unknown in the profession.
Those who were using vacatur to destroy decisions and manip u late
case law were doing so in secret." 10
"We never talked about vacatur in law school," Eduardo admitted . "In fact, we discussed little in civil procedure other than
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, but I went to Yale you know. Where do courts

9 Similarly, in Schoolcraft the plaintiffs were awarded disabiiity benefits while the
litigation '..:as pending. The government then argued that the case was moot in an effort
to prevent the Eigh th Circuit from address ing the jurisdictional issue. See Schoolcmft, 971
F.2d at 83 n.3.
10 For example, when I exp iai ned the practice of postsettle men t vacatur at a conference at New York Un iversi ty, the audience primarily indicated surprise at i~.s existence. See
Colloquium on the Implications of Secrecy in Environmental Law, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. :REV. 187
(1993) (publishing the proceedings of the Colloquium).
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get the authority to vacate a final judgment?" 11
"The federal cou rts have both inherent oower to vacate their
own decisions and statutory power from a variety of sources such
n
r·o r·
. " -.1 exp 1a1ne
• d.
as Fe d ..Drx . c·1v . .!. o
, •o))
"Do you min d if I tak,:: notes on this?" Eduardo rapidly
pulled
out a laptop compute r.
"~f'nat ' s rea.11_
. d.
y a sma1'1 one, , i~ a d m1re
"It's been a time saver. So m uc h of my practice involves fieldwork, and I see so many dients in a day that I need to keep track
of things as they happen. You ,,vere talking about the coun.s ' power to vacate?"
"T he statutes and cmTnnon law suggest," I continued, "that
vacatur is a means of addressing decisions that are defective or un.
.'
b ecause o~.f tne Clrcums t ances un d er wmcn tney were
JUSt,
eitner
rendered or because of subsequent events. Fo r example, Rule
60(b) allows a court, o n motion , to vacate a judgment obtained by
fraud or mistake. 12 Cases also suggest that vacatur is pan of the
cou r t' s inherent power over its own judgments." 13
"Appellate courts can also vacate lower court judgments,
right?" Eduardo inquired .
''Yes. The circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court
both have the power to vacate lower court j udgments as part of
their general power of review. 14 In many cases settled during the
appellate process, the circuit court vacates the lower court judg-

.

1

•

l

• .,

'

11 A final j udgment can res ult from a trial verd ict o r the reso lu tio n o f a dispositive
motion such as a motion for su mmary judgment.
12 See FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (allowi ng reli ef, on mo tion, from a final judgme nt, order or proceeding, for various reaso ns including fraud, mistake, newly discovere d evidence, or a ny other reason justil)·1ng rel ief) . The circuit co urts have not reac hed agreement on whether Rule 60( b) pe rmits cou rts to vacate sua sponte. See Clifton v. Attorney
General, 997 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussi ng split in circuits).
13 See, e.g., Chambers v. N.J\SCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (district court has
inhere nt power "to vacate its 01m judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated u po n the court"); In re First Fin. Dev. Corp ., 960 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1992) (vacating own prior opinion and holding, sua spon te, fo r lack of jurisdiction); Tucker v. American Sur. Co., 191 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Ci r. 1951) ("At common law a co urt has fu ll control over its orders o r judgme nts during the te rm at whi ch they are made, and may, on
sufficient cause shown amend , correc t, open, or vacate such judgme nts." (quoting 49
CJ.S. judgments§ 229 (1947))); Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Yankton, 54 F.2d 304, 309-10
(8 th Cir. 1931) (discms ing inh erent power of court to vaca te , sua sponte, judgme nt that
is voi d fo r w2nt of jurisdiction or procure d by fraud ).
14 28 U.S.C. § 2 106 (1 994) provides:
The Suprem e Co urt or a ny other cou rt of appellate jurisdiction may affi rm ,
modify, vacate , set aside o r reverse any judgme nt, decree, or order of a cour t
lawfully brought before it for revi ew . . . .
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ment. Vacatur is not limited to district court judgments; courts
have been asked to vacate judgments after a circuit court decision
and even after the Supreme Court h as granted certiorari. 15 As to
tt~e effect of vacatur, the black le tter rule is that a vacated decision has no legal force or effect." 16
"Vacatur makes sense if the court has re n dered a defective
judgment," Eduardo observed, "such as whe n 2. litigant has defrauded the court. U nder those circumstances, it also makes sense
that the decision sho u id be completely eradicated . But I don't see
how it follows that the same rules should apply if a case is mooted
by settlement. Settlement doesn't necessarily indicate any defect
with the und eriying judgment. 17 VV'n y should it be e rased simply
because the parties decide to te rminate the litigation?"
"Well, the possibility of seeking vaca tur wh;::n a case settled
pending appeal stemmed from the Supreme Court's decision in a
1950 case,
United States v. J\t[unsingwear," 18 I explained.
"Munsingwear was the second action brought by the government
alleging that Munsingwear had violated a price-fixing regulation.
The first ac tion had been dismissed as moot after an initial trial
court judgment in favor of Munsingwear."
"So the government decided to try again."
"Yes. Munsingwear sought to have the second action dismissed
based on the res judicata effect of the first jud gment. 19 In opposition, the government argued that res judicata did not apply because the first case h ad become moot during the a p pellate process.20 The Court refused to relieve the government from the res

15 See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir.
1993) (court asked to vacate judgment of the Second Circuit); infra notes 33-35 a nd
accompanying text (describing settlement of BonniT Mall litigation after Supre me Court
gra nted certiorari).
16 See, e.g., Chandler v. System Council U-19, No. CV85-AR·l 948-S, slip op. at 4
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 1986), available in LEX IS, Genfed Library, Dist File ("A decision
which is vacated has no precedential value, and for all intents and purposes never existed"). But see infra notes 71-73, 87 and accompanying text (discussing preclusive and
precedential effect of vacated decisions).
17 But see infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text (describing settlement as a possible response to an aberrational decision).
18 340 u.s. 36 (1950).
19 In th e first sui t, the United States sought only injunctive relief. After the trial
court found that Munsingwear's pricing complied with the regulation, th e commodity in
ques ti on was de regulated, and Munsingwear successfully moved the court of appeals to
dismiss th e case as mo ot. The United States then filed a second suit, covering a later
time period, and sought damages for violation of the regulation. See Muns ingwear, 340
U.S. at 37 (describing procedural histo ry of litigation).
20 The cases are in conflict regarding th e appropria te disposition of a case that be·

..,
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judicata effect of the judgment, holding that it could have protected itself by having the first jtidgmerrt vacated when it became
m oot." 2 1
"That sounds more like a case about res judicata than about
vacatur," Eduardo observed.
"That's true," I acknowl-::d,gecL
"The •;V funsinu;vear
~
"' - " c•'
· ommon
c
'
contains some broad langu~ge abo ut vacatur, hovvever, suggesti ng
that vacatur is the Court's no rrn al response to a case that becomes
1
1'
.
moot d unng
tne
appellate
process."·- .!. r-1e government 1h as recently argued to the Supreme Court that 1\!J.unsingwea-r stands for the
. .
'
.
'
'
1.
•
'
genera.1 proposrt10n
tnat
a court 1s
requ m;a
to vacate tne
juagment
23
in a case that becomes m oot oendinrr
. 1-\nd there are
6 aoDea.1
! i
some cases in which the Sumeme Court has followed that prac·'
tice, al though without explicitly considering its propriety." 2 1
"That approach seems to go too far. Aren't most cases, even
those that result in a trial court iudQ"ment,
ulti mately. resolved by
u
settlement? And a litigant can always render a case moot by complying with the terms of the jud gment. 25 It's not logical to re0 •)

~-

l

J

comes moot during th e appe llate process. The general moo tn ess doctrine requires d ismissal unless one of several specified exceptions applies. See Kipp D. Snider, Note, The
Vacatur Remedy for Cases Becoming Moot Upon Appeal: In Search of a Workable Solution f or the
Federal Courts, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1642, 1643-46 ( 1992) (describing exceptions to
mootness doctrine). 'W he ther th e court shouid also vacate its own judgment, o r that of a
lowe r court, when a case becomes moot, is less clear. See infra notes 22-26 and accompan)~ng text. In determining whether mootness compels vacatur, courts have conside red
variously the ci rcumstan ces renderin g the case moot, whether mootness occurred before
or afte r some level of appellate review, a:1d whether the case is "cert\vorthy. " See, e.g.,
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane); id. a t 709 (Edwards, J..
disse nting) (disc ussing wh e ther and under wha t circ umstances dec ision to vacate judgment is discre ti onary and d istinct from findin g of mootness).
21 Munsingwear, 340 U.S . at 41 (holding r.hat government "sle p t on its rights" by failing to move for vacatur).
22 !d. at 39 ("The established prac tice of the Court in dealin g with a civil case from
a court in th e federal sys tem which has becom e moot wh ile on its way h e re or pending
our decision o n the merits .is to reverse o r vacate the judgment below and remand wi th
a direc tion to dismiss.") (foomote om itted ).
23 See Brief for th e U ni ted Sta tes as A.micus Curiae Supporti ng Petitione r at 4, United States Ban corp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. gra nted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714) [herein after U.S. Amicus Brief, Bonner
Mal[j (arguing that fed eral courts are "required to gran t a mo tion to vacate the judgment below when a case becomes moot while the process of appe llate review is ongoing").
24 E.g., Grea t W. Sugar Co. v. Nelso n, 442 U.S. 92 (1979) (per curiam ); see Official
Transc ript of Proceedings before th e Court a t 48 (Oct. 12, 1993), Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaish a v. United States Ph ilips Corp ., )14 S. Ct. 425 (1993) [he re inafter T ranscript, Kaisha] (indicating that th e Court had not focused on the precise im plica ti o ns of
Mu nsingwear for settled cases) .
25 See In re Me morial H osp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988) (fin di ng case set-
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q uire vacatur m all those cases," 26 Ed uardo argued.
"Nor d oes that appear to be what ivl unsingvJear he\d. In a
subsequent decision, Karcher v. Niay, 27 the Court held that the
J111unsinowear
lan~ruag-e
addressed cases that become moot through
0
u
u
'happenstance' an d distinguished them from cas{:s m which
mootness is caused by the voluntary actions of the parties." 28
"That distinction makes sense," Eduardo said. "It may be unfair to cause a party to be bound by a decisio n that it is prevented
from challenging through no fault of its own . But litigants voluntarily give up the right to challenge a decision v1hen they settle
. .'
'f
1 't
tne case; that s s1mp 1y t h e conse quence 01.r: setuemenr.-~
;,_ con
.
" h
.
d
"1
•
.
.
.
un d erstand, 1,e contmue , tne contmued uncertamty about vacatur. You referred to a pending Supreme Court case. If Karcher
clarifies the Ivlunsingwear holding, why is the propriety of vacatur
still before the Court?"
"There is ind eed a pending case, Bonner ji;Jall, 30 in whic h the
Court will be faced with the question of whether J\1unsingwear applies when a case is settled pending ap peal," I responded. "The
reason for the confusion is that the Nlunsingwear Court did not
directly consid er the issue of when vacatur is appropriate. 31 In
Karcher, the Court simply held that vacatur was not com~belled by
M unsingwear, it d id not conclude whe ther vacatur shou ld be employed as a discretionary doctrine."
1

•

'

•

00

tled on appeal "neither more nor less moot than it would be if the loser were satisfied
with the judgment and complied without appealing").
26 But see Penguin Books USA Inc. v. Walsh, 929 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1991) (where pre·
vailing party deliberately took action causing case to become moot prior to appellate
review, court would vacate district court judgment sua sponte). The court explained:
"Were it othenvise, appellees could deliberately moot cases on appeal, thereby shielding
erroneous decisions from reversal." ld. at 73.
27 484 u.s. 72 (1987).
28 ld. at 83 (explaining that the "controversy did not become moot due to circum·
stances unattributable to any of the parties" and therefore "the Munsingwear procedure is
inapplicable . . . . ").
29 Accord Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1439 (1Oth Cir. 1993)
(" [s] ettlements are, by definition, attributable to the parties and not happenstance").
30 United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 ( 1994) (No. 93-714). The case was argued on
October 4, 1994. See Courts and Procedure: Automatic Vacatur Rule, 63 U .S.L.W. 3279 (Oct.
11, 1994) (describing oral c.rgument).
31 ln the oral argument of Bonner Mall, Justice Scc.lia chc.racterized the pending case
as the first time the Court was considering the issue of vacatur upon settiement in an
adversary context. See Official Transcript of Proceedings before the Court at 22-25 (Oct.
4, 1994), United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714) [hereinafter Transcript,
Bonner 1Hall].
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"Will the Court be doing that in Bonner lvfalr?" Eduardo asked.
'"'.t-oss1"b'!.y,'., TJl answere d . "~1· ...
"!-. e rvourt o ngm
. . a.1y
Jl
.
.
grante d cert10ran
32
in Bonner Niall to consider a question of bankruptcy 1aw. Before
. f eu1 or argue d to Lh e ::Supreme a,.__.ourt,
. .,
•
tne case was b ne
m e 1'litigan
ts
agreed to a settlement and confirmed a cons·~ns uai plan of bank3 ~ Th
.
.
..
. en. a'-dv.1seu
. -' tne
'
Court that
.
ruptcy o:rgamzanon.
1e petxtxone
r ·m
the case was moot because of the settl ·~m en t an d rea uested that it
,
'
. . .
.b
",
.
T'ne •...,
vacat-e tne
1ower
court deciSion
• aseG, on JVitmsmgr..uear.
. . . ourt
respo nded by asking for briefing and argurnent o n the question of
whether the rule in Munsingwear sh ould be extended to cases that
become moot due to voluntary se ttlem ent o·.e:nding aooea1." 34
"So the Court is likely to decide whether vacatur is mandated
when a case is settled pending appeal," said Ed uardo .
"Or at least when a case is settled after a gran t of certiorari. 35 T he Court attempted to consider the propriety of rou tine
vacatur more broad ly last year in the Kaisha case,"35 I went o n,
"but ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari on standing
grounds, 37 over the dissent of nvo Justices,38 without reaching
1

~

1

2

·''--

t_..;

Jt.!.

32 See United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnersh ip, 2 F.3d 899
(9th Cir. 1993) , cert. granted, 11 4 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714). T he Court was to consider the propriety of the new value exception to the absolute p ri o rity rule in bankruptcy. For a descripti on of the litigatio n history in Bonner Mall, see David F. Pike, Stoel Rives
Attomey to Argue a "Hot" Issue of ?rocedure, WASH . J., Apr. 11, 1994, at l.
33 Pike, supra note 32. at 1.
34 See Bonner A•l all, 114 S. Ct. 1367 (1994) (directing pa rties to brief and a rgue the
following questi on: "Should th e rule an nou nced in United States v. Munsingwear, 340
U.S. 36 (1950) , exte nd to cases that become moot in th is Co urt beca use of the volunta!)'
settlement of th e parties?").
35 See Reply Bri ef of Petitioner at 3, Bonn eT ii·lail (No. 93-71 4) (arguing th at the case
on ly presen ts the iss ues of wh ether vacatur is appi'op riate for "certworthy" cases that are
settled in the Supre me Court). Se ttl emen t of cern,·orthy cases arguzbly presents unique
policy considera tions because the Supreme Court's gra nt af ce rtio rari mzy have indicated
that th e lower cou rt decision was worthy of review. ld. a t 11; see also Clarke v. United
States, 915 F. 2d 699, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane ) (Edwards , J., dissenting) (distinguishing cases that become moot in the Supreme Court because fu rther appe llate review
of those cases is not a matter of right); cf Jo int Motio n , Schooiaajt. supra note 8 (reques ting Supreme Court to grant certiorari fo r the sole purpose of vacatin g the lower
court decisio ns after case was settled during th e pende ncy of pe titions for ce rti o rari).
36 See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabusbiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp. , 114 S.
Ct. 425, 426 (1 993) (per curiam) (quoting question pr::sented by Kaisha in petition for
certiorari as "Sho uld the United States Courts of Appeals routinely vacate d istric t court
fin al judgments at th e parties' request when cases ?.re se ttled wh ile on appeal?").
37 Jd. at 428 (dism issing wri t of certiorari as improvidently granted because petitioner was not a party to the appeal below).
38 justices Stevens and Blackm un dissc:nted from the d ismissal and indicated that
they co nsidered it appropriate to reac h the me rits and t.hat, on the merits, they would
reve rse the judgment of the Federa l Circuit which had granted the motion to vacate.
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the Issue of vacatur."
"One thing that confuses me about vacatur," Edua!"do ohserved, "is the jurisdiction of the courts. If settlement renders the
case moot/9 as th e litigants argue in Bonner .Niall, there is ilO longer a case or controversy for .Article III purposes. 10 How then
does a court have the au thority for vacatur, an affirmat.ive judicial
act beyond ·what is necessary to resolve the ongoin g litigation?"·\]
"It is true that the decision o n vacatur appears to be divorced
from resolution of the particular litigation before the coun..42 In
a sense, the court is simply arti cula ting the future consequences of
it~ decision , an action th at arguab ly extends beyond the proper
role of the judiciary. I think that issue may be broader than vacatur, however, an d d epend o n how you view the structural role of
the judiciary \vi th respect to lavvTfl.aking ge n e rally."
"Isn't this question analogous to that raised by retroact1v1ty in
adjudication?" Eduardo asked . "In cases in which a court applies a
new rule of law prospectively, the court has similarly divorced its
announcement of rules to govern future cases from the application of those rules to the case before it." 43
"I don't see the relationship ."
"It's two sides of the same coin," Eduardo explained. "'When a
court announces a new rule of law but holds that its ruling will be
purely prospective, it is announcing a principle for future litigants,
no t for the parties before it. When a court vacates a previous
judgment, it is announcing that its prior decision will not be the
law for future litigants, in spite of the fact that it had been applied to the parties in that case. In both cases, the court's decision

J. , di>senting).
39 The settlemen t may also present Articl e III standing issues. See infra notes 115-30
an d accompanying text.
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. l. The Supreme Court first suggested that the doctrine of mootness was based on the limi ta tions of Article III in Liner v. J afco, Inc., 375
U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). See Evan Tsen Lee , Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example
of 1'-l!ootness, 105 HARV . L. REv. 605 (1992) (tracing and criticizing origins of constitutional
component of moo tness).
41 The Cons titution requires the fe dera l courts to dismiss cases that become moot
during th e litigation process. See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 ( 1987) ("Article
Ill of the Co nstitution req uires that th ere be a live case o r controversy a t the time that
a federal court decides th e case . . .. ").
42 The issues are se pa rate so long as settlement is not co ndition ed o n vacatur. See
infra note 47 and accompanying text.
43 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Geo rgia, 501 U.S ..529, 547 ( 199 1) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. a t 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (ques tioning constitutionality of prospective adjudication under Article III).
Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 428 (Stevens]. & Blackmun
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is co ncerned exclusively with the future conseque nces of the rule
of law rather than the resolution of a pending case."
"I su p pose that is true," I admitted. "In retroactivity an alysis
the debate seems to be betwee n those who v1e·w the aoproDriate
role o f courts as making the law and those, li ke J ustice Scalia, who
argu e that courts should 'fin d' the law."
"The characterization of jud ges as 'discovering' the law is
, "le to B'lac k'Stone, " 44 l<d
' pom
. tea' o u t. " JUST
actua.ll y attn.,outab.
L
uarao
tice Scalia doesn' t ugo quite that far. He is sim p'· ly) awuinofor a
0
greate r fideli ty by the courts to textual analysis by calling for
j u dges to d ecide cases as though they were fi n d ing the law. '145
""N
~
1
•
. we 11 taKen,
'
" I sa1d
. . . .,· Ga
" rrymg
.
t'_",._P
1 o n etrH:.ess
your pomt
IS
anaiogy through, by 1equesting vacatur, the li tigants are asking a
court to 'lose' the law it h as previously 'found. " 146
"Put in those terms, vacatur seems like a type of preced ential
h ide and seek," Eduardo o bserved. "Allowing routine vacatur also
seems inconsistent with the broader structure of adj udica tive lawmaking."
"T hat concern is more properly addressed to the p ropriety of
routine vacatur than to th e courts' power to vacate. Vacatur does
raise a numbe r of interesting policy issues."
"vVith respect to the courts' power, I sup pose the Article III
issue can be avoided," Eduardo mused, "by litigants -vvi.th a little
foresight. If the parties incorporated vacatur into the terms of the
settlement agreemen t or conditioned settlement upon vacatur, the
case would not be moot, and the court \vould be compelled to
resolve the motion."
"That's exactly what the litigants d id in Nest le Co. v. Chester's
Market, In c. ,~ the leading Second Circuit decision on the propri1

1

i_j

7

44 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTO NE, COMMENTARIES ON THE L-\WS OF E0.'GL-\N D 69 (15th
ed. 1809) (expounding deciara tory theory of adjudication). Although the view that judges
discover ra th er than crea te th e law is ge nerally a ttributed to Blackstone, a sim ilar view
was expressed by Sir Ma tthew Hale 13 years before Blackston e was born . See Linkle tte r v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 6 18, 623 n.7 (1965) (citing GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
206 (1st ed. 1909)) .
45 James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia; J., concurring in the
judgmen t).
46 See Brief of Respon dent at 36, United States Bancorp Mo rtgage Co. v. Bon ne r
Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), em. gran ted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No . 93714) [hereinafter Res pondent's Brief, Bonner Mall] (characterizing request for vacatu r as
"asking this Cou rt to take the law that the Ninth Circuit has 'found' and, th rough vacatur, to 'lose ' that law so it may be fo und another day").
47 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) .
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ety of postsettlement vacatur. The court in Nestle agreed that the
case was not moot and reached its decision by balancing the policies implicated by the motion. Because so many settlements explicitly address the issue of vacatur," I added, "it's possible that the
Supreme Court will move beyond the !Vlunsingwear question and
address at least some of the policy considerations of postsettlement
vacatur."

HI.

SETTLEMENT TOOL OR BA_,~GAINING C H IP? EDUARDO DEBiUES
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND ROUTINE VACATUR

"If vacatur is discretionar;', the q uestion is whether
Munsingwear should be extended to cases that are settled pending
appeal. Alternatively, what standard should the cour ts apply in
ruling on a motion to vacate?" I said. "This is the subject that has
generated the broadest disagreement among the lower courts." 48
"Why is there so much disagreement?" Eduardo asked.
"Primarily because the courts differ on the policy reasons for
and against routine vacatur," I suggested.
"Let's talk about the policy arguments. I understand why a
litigant would seek vacatur-to erase the preclusive or precedential
effect of a decision with which the litigant disagrees. But why do
courts condone this manipulation?" Eduardo asked.
"There are several reasons why courts allow vacatur when a
case is settled pending appeal. Possibly the dominant rationale is
that vacatur is seen as encouraging settlement. This is th e argument espoused by the Secon d Circuit, which would be ruling on a
motion to vacate in your case." 49
"vVhat do you mean? How can vacatur encourage settlement?"
"A number of circuit courts, like the Second Circuit, maintain
extensive settlement programs at the app ellate level. 50 T hese pro-

48 See Fisch, Rewriting Hist01)', supra note 5, at 602-06 (describing varying approaches
to motions to vacate taken by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); see also
Clarendon, Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d !27 (3d Cir. 1991) (adopting general
policy against vacatur when case is settled pending appeal); In re United States, 927 F.2d
626 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819
F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (favoring routine vacatur).
49 The motion to vacate when a case is settled after final judgment can be made either to the district court that rendered the decision or to the circuit court once an appeal has been filed. Fisch, Rewriting HistOI)', supra note 5, at 596-98.
50 See id. at 590 n.6 (describing programs used by circuit courts to encourage settlement pending appeal); Judith Resnik, V\ 7hose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Rnle of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1471, 1501-04 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose Judgment?] (describing development of
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grams are consistent with a strong policy of encouraging voluntary
se ttlement to conserve public and judicial resources .51 Obviously
one impediment to settlement on appeal is the adverse consequences of the lower court decision for the losing party. If the
vitality of the decision can be negotiated away as part of th e settlement process, it will be easier to persuade the losing party to give
up its right to appeal."
"The losing litigant buys off its adversary in exchange for
free d om from any collateral consequences of the decision'?" asked
Eduardo.
"That's right," I said. "Several circuits have adopted a policy of
expressly allowi n g vacatur as part of the settlement process in
order to encourage the settlement of cases pending appeal. "
"Isn't encouraging settlement at the appellate level really a
false economy?" Eduardo questioned. "If the litigants know they
can routinely escape the adverse consequences of a trial court
decision through post-trial settlement and vacatur, the stakes of
going to trial are lower. I would think this would encourage litigants to go to trial more often."
"I've made precisely that argument myself," I agreed.52 "By
permitting vacatur, courts are making the risk of a trial less costly,
thereby reducing the incentive for early settlement. A recent study
of settlement rates in California lends support to this view. Professor Stephen Barnett studied settlement rates in the California
appellate courts and fou n d that cases settled twice as often in the
one appellate division that refused to grant motions to vacate
when cases were settled after trial. "53
"And because the largest litigation expenses occur at the pretrial and trial stages, the delay in settlement until after trial is extremely costly," 54 Eduardo observed. "So the rationale that vacatur

appellate settlement programs in response to judicial policy of encouraging settlement).
51 See generally Stephen MeG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary
System, 44 HASTINGS LJ. l (1992) (describing how the general U.S. policy in favor of settlement has been expanded by various procedural innovations).
52 See Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 635-38 (using economic analysis to
argue that availability of routine vacatur encourages litigants to delay settlement).
53 Stephen R. Barnett, lv1aking Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal
in the California Supreme Cow1, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. l 033 ( 1993).
54 This consumption of resources occurs to a substantial, albeit lesser, extent when a
case is resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Current litigation practices typically
involve the resolution of the majority of factual issues through pretrial procedures such
as discovery. To the extent that the litigants complete discovery and resolve the case
through a motion for summary judgment, that judgment is the result of substantial com-
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conserves judicial resources doesn't m ake sense as a reason to allow vacatur." 55
"Well, deference to the request of the litigants, when they
se ttle a case and request vacatur, can he read more broadly than a
desire to co nserve judicial resources," I said . "Vacatur is also consistent with the view of litigation as a process driven by private
parties for the resolu tion of private disputes. By d enying a request
to vacate in a case in which se ttle me nt is cond itioned on vacatur,
a court is, in a sense, forcing the litigants to continue the litigation agains t their wills. "56
"I understand that litigation was tradi tionally conceptualized as
a private d ispute resolution mechanism, but hasn't modern jurisprudence evolved toward a more public law m odel? If you loo k at
cases like Brown v. Board of Education57 or Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 58 the point of the litigation is to develop and enforce social
norms, not to resolve the dispute in an isolated transaction."
"That certainly is one strand in the d evelopment of modern
civil litigation," I acknowledged, "and I think it extends beyond socalled 'public interest' litigation. Even classically private areas of
law such as tort and contract litigation are now being viewed as
furthering societal goals. Toxic tort cases like asbestos litigation
alter societal safety and cleanup standards, 59 for example, and

mitment of resources as well. Moreover, a case may result in the creation of multiple
trial opinions and even appellate opinions prior w the completion of a trial.
55 See Benavides v. Jackson Nat' ! Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Colo.
1993) (The experience of "this and oth er d istric t courts" de monstrates "that vacatur saves
far less in circuit court resources than, by its perverse in ce ntive for litigants to stall on
settlement until after judgment, it costs th e district courts a nd the parties.").
56 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt. , Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Ci r. 1985) (refusing
to deny vacatur on the basis that it would force iitigants to co ntinue li tigation they were
willing to settle). There is support in other contexts for a court's power to review and
reject a settlement agreement as unfair. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1 (providing for court
approval of settlement of shareholder derivative litigation); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (pro\-iding for judicial review of settlement of claims by and against bankruptcy estates); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727 & n.13 (1986) (discussing judicial authority to authorize
class action settlements). Moreover, th e co urts have consistently imposed !imitations on
litigants' ab ility to control their jurisdiction through stipulation. See, e.g. , Dannenberg v.
Sofnvare Toolworks Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal where litigants
attempted, by stipulation , to co nvert order of partial summary judgment into final appealable orde r).
57 347 U.S 483 (1954) (The Supreme Co urt later addressed the remedial issue in
Brown \'. Board of Educ., 349 U .S. 294 (1955)).
58 11 2 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
59 See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 268-76 (1986) (explaining and distinguishing betwee n public and private law
approaches to toxic tort litigation); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Judicial P.elief and Public Tort
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products liability suits encourage manufac tu rers and sellers to
provide safer products .60 One comm entator has even argued that
the development of publ ic values through litigation justifies freeing courts from the traditional case or controversy limitations on
their jurisdiction. "5 1
"That seems like an extreme position," Eduardo observed.
"It also reflects only one side of the public law/private law
debate .62 There 's an e quaily compelling argu ment that courts are,
and sh ould be, increasin gly focusing on how to facilitate dispute
resolution. T he appellate settlernent programs I mentioned earlier
are simply one example of this trend. Look at the growth in alternative d ispute resolution ("A,_f)R") procedures suc h as arbitra tion
and mediation and the courts' reaction to those processes.63
Courts are not sim ply deferring to litigants ' desire to use these
tools, they are actively encouraging and in some cases m anda ting
ADR. 64 In a recent case, a court tried to forc e the parties to undergo a nonbinding summary jury trial as a m eans of inducing
settlement. "65
"I suppose the increasingly litigi ous nature of U.S. society and
the scarcity of judicial resources encourage that outlook," Eduardo
said. "It's hard to understand why courts would accept a role purely as arbiters of private disputes. T hat characterization would seem

Law, 92 YALE LJ. 749 (1983).
60 See, e.g., Rich ard L. Marcus. Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 647, 671 ( 1988) (explaining that th e deve lopment of new theories of tort liability alters the behavior of provide rs of goods and se rd ces).
61 Lee, supra note 40 (arguing that the "public values" model of litigation justifies
re moving constitutional pe rspec tive from mootn ess and recas ting the doctrine as purely
prudential).
62 See id. at 62&-28 (ex pla inin g a nd contrastin g "disp ute reso lution " model and "public values" model of litigation). Fo r a discussion of th e public law model of litigation , see
generally Abraham Chayes, T he ,'?.n/e of the judge in Public La w Litigation, 89 H ..>JW. L. REv.
1281 (1976) and Owen M. Fiss, The S upreme Court, 1978 Tenn Fon:ward: The Fonns of justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (] 979) .
63 See, e.g., Raymond ]. Broderick, Yes to Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, 18 LITIG. 3
(1992) (describing development and use of court-ann exed ADR programs).
64 Congress rec ently j oi n ed in the effort by e nacting th e Civil J ustice Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as ame nded in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.), which requires each of the federal district co urts to deve lop plans to promote
the reduction of "expense an d de lay" in civil litigation.
65 Strandell v. Jackson Coun::y, 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D . Ill. 1987) (setting forth ra tionale behind order co mpelli ng summa!)' juT)' trial a nd hold ing attorney in crimina l conte mpt for refusin g to pa rticipa te). The Seven th Circu it vacated the judgment of co nte mpt, holding th at FED. R. CN. P. 16 did not pe rmit courts to compel the parties to
pa rticipate in summary jury trials. Strandell 1' . Jackscn Cou n ty, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7 th
Cir. 1988).
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to diminish the prestige and importance of the judicial role. 1
would thi nk courts would be anxious to preserve the role of the
courts as lawmakers."
"In a way, arbitration and other forms of ADR do p reserve
that roie, by separating the d ispute resolution process from the
traditio nal triaL The problem is that it tends to leave the courts
operating primarily as case managers." 66
"But the emphasis on ADR should also increase the significance of cases that go to trial," Eduardo cou ntered . "Xf th e courts
are wal'; of allowing the consumption of resources invo lved in a
fu ll trial on the merits, they should be more interested in p reservmg the results of th at trial."
"It does seem counterintuitive for a court that wants to discourage the litigant-; fro m going to trial to allow them to erase
the resul t of the trial so easily."
"Preserving the judgment presumably has value in obviating
the n eed for future litigation by others," Eduardo continued.
"Absolutely," I agreed. "The doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel are designed to preserve judicial reso urces by
preventing relitigation of issues that had been thoroughly aired in
a prior proceeding. 67 Eliminating the preclusive effect of the
judgment is one of the primary reasons for seeking vacatur. 68
"How important is the potential for preclusio n in a court's
determination as to whether vacatur is appropriate?" Eduardo asked.
"It depends on the circuit," I answered. "The Federal Circuit

66 See generaily Robert Peckham, The Federal judge as Case i'v!anager: Th e New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL L. REv. 770 (1 98 1) ; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 H.-\RV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
67 See, e.g., Pa rklan e Hosiery Co . v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 ( 1979); Blonder-Tongue
Lab. , Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S . 313 (1971) . T he doctri nes of pre clusion
also preserve fin ality. !d. ; see also Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 38 (stressing need for· doctrine
of res jud icata to provide "terminal points for litiga tion") . Th e Court has co ntinued to
rea ffirm these values. See, e.g., Cardinal Chern. Co. v. Morton Int"l Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967
(1993) (public values in resolution of pa tent validity justify prese iV<~tion of judgment after
subseque nt finding of non infringement) .
68 See, e.g., William D. Zeller, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned upon the
Vacatur of En tered judgmm ts, 96 YALE L.J. 860 (1987) . The plaintiff in Ka isha sought vacatur for the very purpose of avoiding preclusio n based on a jury trial in th e Southern
District of Florida. At th e tim e of th e Supreme Court a rgum ent, a second tribunal, the
No rthern District of Illin ois, h ad relied on the Florida judgme nt to bar re litigation of
va rious iss ues; the Illinois court then re instated the claims whe n th e Federal Circuit vaca ted the Flo rida judgment. Kaisha, ll4 S. Ct. at 429 (Stevens, J., disse nting); see also Brief
fo r Respondent at 2-7, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaish a v. Un ited States Philips
Corp .. 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123) (describing the history of litigation in Flo rida
and Illin ois).
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granted the motion to vacate in Kaisha over the d irect o bjection
of the third parry litigant who sought to rely on the judgment. 69
O ther courts vvill consider the existence of third parties who will
benefit fro m the judgment or future litigation that can be avoided
th rough preclusion doctrines in the vacatur decision . The N inth
Circuit, for e xam p le, has enunciated a balancing test under which
the interests of third parties in the preclusive effect of the judgment is one relevant facto r." 70
"Sh o uld the courts' a pproach to motions to vacate reaily be
determined by concern abo ut preclusion?" Eduardo asked . "I
mean, couldn ' t courts just continue to rely on vacated decisions
for preclusive cffect?" 71
"In fact, a few courts have done so," 72 I said. "Under current
practice, hmvever, that approach is dangerous. After all, the vacatu r decision may be based on factors other than the settlement,
such as a defec t in the underlying d ecision. 73 Current methods of

59 See United States Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 73()..31 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (denying .Kaisha's motion to intervene a nd granting motion to vacate Fl orida
judgment despite its preclusive effec t).
70 See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 89 1 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir.
1989) (denying motion to vacate because of utili ty of judgme nt in actions pe nding
against several o th e r parties arising out of same transacti o n) ; Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Western Conference of Tea mste rs, 636 F.2d 720, 721 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying balancing test and denyin g vacatur because trial court's findings had already bee n given
collateral estoppel effec t in a second action).
71 The general rul e is th at vacated decisions have no precl usive effect for eith er res
judicata or collateral esto ppel purposes. See Michael W. Lo ude nslager, Note, Erasing the
Law: The Implication s of Settlements Conditioned Upon Vacatur or Reversal of judgments, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV . 1229, 1247 n.158 (1993) (citing cases); see also Plaintiffs' Respo nsive
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment upo n Magistrate J udge's Reconsideration Thereof at 10-13, Levan v. Capi tal Cities/ ABC, In c. (S .D.
Fla.) (No. 92-0325-CIV-ATKINS) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Responsive Memorandum, Levan]
(arguing that cases vacated due to settlement have no preclusive effect).
72 See, e.g., Bates v. Unio n Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding application of collateral estoppel effect to vacated judgm ent in Amos v. Union Oil Co., 663 F.
Supp. 1027 (D. Or. 1987), wh ere record reveal ed th at vacatin g judge had not co nsidered
the effect of vacatur on judgment's preclusive effect); Cheme tron Corp. v. Busin ess
Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1187 (5th Cir. 1982) (giving collate ral estoppel effect to trial
co urt findings resulting from two month bench trial that had bee n vacated as a res ult of
se ttl eme nt, in Cosmos Bank v. Bintliff, No. 67-H-590 (S.D . Tex. 1975)). The Fifth Circuit
later stated tha t Ch emetron has no precedential force. H ughes v. San ta Fe Int'l Corp. , 847
F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 618-20 (discussing problems with Chemetron approac h and noting th e reasons why it has no t been
wid ely followed).
73 Moreover, the parties ' decision to settle may have been influenced by th e ir perception that the judgment wc.s defec tive. See infra notes 14()..47 and accompanying text
(discussing settlement as a response to an aberrational jud gment) .
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repo rting fre quently do not distinguish cases vacated solely as a
result of settlement from cases vacated on other grounds. Thus, a
court should reasonably be wary of concluding when a case h as
been vacated that it nonetheless offe red th e losing litigant a 'full
and fai r opportunity to litigate. "' 74
"I can see the problem with h aving a court rely on a decision
that isn't really good law or on erroneous fin dings o f fact,"
Eduard o acknowledged. "But this could be addressed by changing
our m e th ods of reporting subsequent case h istory to indicate whe n
a case is vacated as a result of m ootness o r settlement/5 thereby
iden tifying when reliance by a subsequent court is justifie d.'' 76
"Even that identification process m igh t prove unreliable ," I
suggested. "To what extent should a court indicate, in a d ecision
to vacate, its reservations about the validity of the original judgme n t? Does a failure to record su ch rese rvations demonstrate a
willingness for the verdict to have preclusive dfect?"
"Presumably many cases that are settled pending appeal present legitimate appealable issues," Eduardo observed.
"But should the availability of a nonfrivolous appeal deprive
the verdict of validity if the appeal process is not completed?" I
asked .77
"I suppose it depends upon the extent to which the verdict 1s
defective."
"But how do we assess that?" I pressed. 78 "For example, a
court in Florida recently vacated a jury verdict in a securities fraud
class action suit. Although vacatur was based on a settlement

74 Parkian e Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979) (intern al quotations
omiued).
75 See Letter from Richard A. Givens to Matthew Cheney, She pard's/McGraw Hill
(Jan. 26, 1994) (on file with author) (suggesting Shepard's adopt a case history symbol
indicating when a case has been vacated due to se ttlem ent) .
76 Courts have been known to take precisely the opposite approach. Fo r example ,
the vacatur order in Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 621 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N .Y. 1981), slates that the court was vacatin g its judgment so H artford could
submit additional affidavits regarding Bankers T rust's motion for summary judg ment. !d.
In fact, the parties had settled the litigation with the und e rstandin g that th e trial court
would vacate its judgment based on th e settlemen t. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying te xt (desc;-ibing Bankers Tmst litiga ti o n ) .
77 See Transc ript, Bonner Mall, supra no te 31, at 14 (co unsel for U.S. Ba nco r-p arguing th a t, so long as court of appeals has not comple ted its revi ew, decision of lowe r
court is not fin al) ; id. at 28 (argume nt by Soli cito r Gen eral that Supreme Co urt's gra nt
of certio ra ri rende rs court of appeals' de cision "te ntative") .
78 The Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to adopt a procedure of partia l
review in settled cases, in which it would determine if th e matter we re certworthy and, if
so, va cate witho ut granting full review. See id. a t 19.
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agreement, the court expiicitly stated in granting the motion to
vacate that the j ury verdict 'didn 't comply 't,ith any of the
evidence' 79 and that the defendants had reaso nable grounds fo r
appeal. 80 Should those statements prevent a subsequent court
fro m giving the verdict preclusive effect?"
"It sounds as if there was a probiem with the jury verdict,"
Eduardo said.
"Possibly. On the othe r hand, notwithstanding its articluated
reservations about the verdict, the court had previously refused to
grant a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 81 Although the court may have believed the verdict was defective, it
may also have been inf1 uenced by the p3rties' express desire to
prevent the verdict from being used in a re lated pending case. 82
If preclusion depends on how vaca tur is labeled or whether it
appears to result from a defective judgment, savvy litigants are
going to attem pt to control the record."
"And I suppose the same factors that lead courts like the
Second Circuit to grant initial requests for vacatur would cause
them to defer to litigants ' requests regarding the subsequent designation of the case,"83 Eduardo admitted. "In that case, a new la-

79 Transcript of Hea rin g a t 13 (May ll , 1993), Purce ll v. Bankatlantic Fin . Corp.
(S.D. Fla.) (Nos. 89-1284, 89-1 605, 89-1850) .
80 The court also issued a final judgment of vacatur in which it stated that it had
"serious reservations about th e award and . . . the legal m lin gs upon which it is based."
Final Judgment Approving Settl e me nt an d Order of Dismissal at 4, PurcelL
81 See Order on Plaintiffs' Mo tion to Ainend Judgm e nt to Add Prejudgment Inte res t
at 4, Purcell. ("This Court cannot say that the jury's verdi ct was irrational or without
factual and evidentiary found ation , and has accordin gly de ni ed Defe ndants' motions for
judgment as a matter of law a nd in the alternative for a new trial in prior orders.").
82 At the time th e Purcell litigation was settled, th e parti es we re aware that the
Purcell verdict might have p reclusive effec t in Levan v. Capital Cities/ ABC, Inc. (S.D. Fla.)
(No. 92-325-CIV-ATKINS) . The Purcell settlement agree me nt was conditioned on th e court
both vacating the judgment and jury verdict in thei r entirety an d "decrce [ing] that such
verdict and judgment shall have no res judicata, colla te ral estoppe l, or any preclusive
effec t whatsoever . . . . " Stipulation of Settlement at 20, Purcell.
83 An example of this deference can be found in the recent settlement of securities
fruad litigation involving Miniscribe. As pan of a post-trial settleme nt of a lawsuit involving several m~or defendants in th e litigation, the co urt agre ed to sign decisions indicating that the prior jury verd icts we re "not supported by sufficient evide nce" and "contrary
to th e great weight and preponderance of evidence." Andrew Pollack, Big Defenda nts Settle
in Miniscribe Lawsuit, N.Y. TlM ES, Feb. l 9, 1992, at D4 . According to Pollack's article, th e
judge indicated in an interview that he had acted solely out of a desire to facilitate the
settl eme nt. '" I did strike the jury ve rd ict down but only as a result of the settlement, not
as a n independe nt decision th at the j ury verdict was bad or a nything."' !d. Notably, at
th e time of the se ttlemen t, there we re several pend ing lawsuits based on the same
transactions, including a shareholde r suit and an action by the Securi ties and Exchange
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beling me th od wouldn't solve a nything. lV1oreover, if 'Ne allow
courts to rely on vacated d ecisions, are n't we depriving the litigants of th e benefit of their b argain? "'{ou j us t said tha t removing
the preclusive effec t of a decision was a substantial fac to r m many
-r "
__
:r·'"L-' linu ·.". .'. n:- ~ fo ~1 -,::~....... ratll
1
1
" "
r
•
· ·•
"
C
..
.i.' n a t ' s a ra1r
pomt,
1" sa1• d . " _Tf a court lS gomg to o.e1er
to
the litigants by granti ng vacatur, it hardly seems a p p ropriate to
take b<:.ck part of the value of the settle me nt by allowing the j udgme n t to continue to have co11ateral cffects. 8'i .A...nd if the Second
Circuit is correct in belleving that vacatur encou:rages se ttlement, a
vacatur with reduced con seq uences vvill h e less ·effective in achieving th a t objective , by m aking vacatur less of a 'bargai n ing
ch ip.'" 85
"It would be even worse if reliance on vacated d ecisions varied from case to case," Eduardo warned. "'With a uniform rule,
parties cou ld assess the value of vacatur as part of the se ttlement
negotiation. How is a litigant to decide whether a settlement addresses problems such as the collateral consequences of the judgment, if the litigant cannot determine what those co llateral consequences are.;l"
"You're right. Inconsistent use of vacated decisions would
inject additional uncertainty into the se ttlement process. Since
uncertainty is already the most significant barrier to settlement, 86
courts would be making settlement more difficult and defeating
the rationale for permitting vacatur."
"I su ppose if reliance on vacated opinio ns became sufficiently
widespread , vacatur would have little value to litigants considering
settleme n t after trial. This just takes us back to the in itial question
~~

-

~

~1.

Commission. ld.
84 See, e.g. , United States v. Phillips, No. 922-6064, 1993 U.S. App . LEXIS 4643, at *6
n.2 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1993) ("The very purpose of vacating the district court's o rder is to
insure that no collateral consequences flow from an orde r which has escaped appellate
review on th e me rits.'').
85 Man ufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 335 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting In re Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Ser:s., 862
F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)).
86 See Fisch , Reuniting History, supra note 5, at 634-35 (describing importance of informa tion about the value of case and likelihood of success in allowing parties to reach
settlemen t agreement); Robe rt H . Mnookin & Louis Korn hause r, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of DivoTce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 ( 1979) (o utcornes of se ttl ed cases are a
function of th e parties' expec tancies conce rning the ou tco m e at trial); Steve n Shavell &
Louis Kaplow, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social
Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 594 (1989) (analyzing role of information about consequences of litigation in settle ment process) .
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abou t whether or no t vacatur is desirable."
"\Nell , remember that the value of a j udicial decision is not
limited to preclusion," I said. "A judgment is a precedent, and the
effect of a precedent extends beyond a particular d ispute. Vacatur
destroys that precedential value as weil. 87 Of course, most requests are for vacatur of trial court decisions 83 which., although
• e!lect,
·" t::
' va lue as pr·ccede
. nt. "89
tney may h ave prec 1us1ve
are orr 1'lttle
"Presumably, the value of encouragin g settlement dim inishes
once a case has generated not merely a trial level b ut also an
appellate decision ," E duardo observed. "I don't thirrk you're right
to dismiss the import:mce of trial court decisions though . Is it
really true that these decisions are not valid as preced ent? T hey're
cited aH the time." 90
I

87 Most courts have assum ed \vithout detailed a nalysis that vacatur eliminates the
precedential effect of a decision. See, e.g., Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabush iki Kaisha v. Unit·
ed States Philips Corp. , 114 S. Ct. 425, 43 1 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
routine vacatur as objectionabl e because judicial precedents are presumptively cotTect and
valuable and should not be eliminated at the parties' request); Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 11 F.3d at 384 (refusing to allow vacatur of appellate court judgment where it
would allow "a party \vith a deep pocket to eliminate an unreviewable precedent it dis·
likes"); In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)
(vacatur would improperly tum a precedent into the parties' property); Loudenslager,
supra note 71, at 1242-43 nn.l32-35 (citing cases).
The government has also argued that vacatur renders a decision of no precedential
effect. See Transcript, Kaisha, supra note 24, at 45 . But see id. at 36--40 (debate during oral
argument in which effect of vacated opinion was described variously ranging from per·
suasive authority, the equivalent of a law review article, to binding on the same distric t
court under principles of stare decisis, to constituting the law of the circuit and binding
precedent). The effect of vacatur upon the precede ntial effect of a decision was a prima·
ry subject of questioning during th e Bonner Mall argument. See, e.g., Tr2nscript, Bonner
Mall, supra note 31, at 4-7, 21, 26-28 .
88 The distinction in precedential value betwee n trial and appellate court decisions
could justifY application of a different standard to reques ts to vacate appe llate court judgments. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., ll F.3d at 385 (distinguishing betwee n trial
and appellate decisions and holding that, with res pect to appellate decisions, the public
interest in preserving precedent takes precedence over the interest in encouraging settle·
ment). It would also be possible to distingu ish cases th at become moot in the U.S. Supre me Court due to settlement from other appellate decis ions. See supra note 35 (de·
scribing effort of petitioner in United States Banco1p to distinguish "certworthy" cases).
89 See, e.g., In re Smith , 964 F.2d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1992) (district court decisions
have no precedential effect); Lee, supra note 40, at 668 n.360 (stating although there is
some authority that, in the absence of higher authority. district courts should follow the
decisions of other district courts within the same state, the weight of authority is to the
con trary) ; Brief for the United States as Am icus Curio.e Supporting Respondents at 25-26,
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp. , 11 4 S. Ct. 425
(1993) (No. 92-1123) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha] (characterizing precedential
value of district court decisions as "debatable").
90 Furth ermore, many issues such as discovery disputes and other collateral orders

346

NOTRE DAME L\W REVIEW

[VoL 70:2

"A case may be cited for its persuasive or informational val ue
witho ut being a binding preced ent," I said . "Vlitness the fact that
lower court decisions are cited to the courts of appeals and the
Su prem e Coun . Clearly those d ecisions aren't cited becau se they
-ere
b;.<HI_Ll.
. . . . ~ ·i ·"C'
...., r..,.;.-·o lY"l-:-.tr
d.t
LO r.;\ ._.Ui
-lj . '' 91
"Does a decision have to be binding upon a co u rt to cons titute a p recedent?" Eduardo wondered . "I suppose I'm asking how
you define precedent b efore you discount the value of these dis92
trict COl!ft ODii1iOrls."
l

'T ve always considered a precedent to be a prior decision tha t
the court d.ecidi ng a particuiar case must follmv; so, yes, I would
think a d ecision must be binding u pon the co urt to be a precedent."93
~'Bt-tt surely tt1 e issue of how bindi11 g is a rnat.ter of degree,
.
h
., m akes
. -Fi ltlon
. .
"11 . " .t · uarco
l
w h 1c stl1i
any de~m
1 uslVe,
pers1.ste r1u. "UT
v. e
know, for instance, that lower courts routinely seek to distinguish
precedents that they do not want to follow. 94 Because subsequent
cases are rarely ide ntical, the degree to which a precedent will be
binding is limited only by the creativity of the decisionmaker. 95
Moreover the Supreme Court continues to vacillate on the degree
~d

are rarely th e subject of appellate decisions. See, e.g., Thomas J. Dougherty, 'Fraud on the
lvlarket' Securities Class Action Certification D ecisions, INSIGHTS , Apr. 1994, at 20 (describing
fa ct that although securities class actio n certification decisions have substa ntiai impact,
th ey a re rarely subject to appellate review). On these topics, district court decisions form
the e ntire corpus of decisional law.
91 Indeed, in its recent decision in Central Bank of Denver v. Firs t Inters tate, 114 S.
Ct. J.139 ( 1994), the Supreme Court overruled decisions by all e!eYen fede ral courts of
appeals that had recognized aidin g and abe tting liability under § !O(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See John F. Olson et al., The En d of the Section JO(b) Aiding and
Abetting Liability Fiction, l NSlGHTS, Jur~e 1994, at 8 n .7 (citing circuit court dec isions).
92 An y atte mpt to de fine precedent must include an examin ation of th e values that
are promoted by judicia! adheren ce to precedent, such as finality, cohere nce, fairness,
pre dictabiliry a nd et1iciency. See H e nry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Con stitu tion al A.djudicalion, 88 COUJM . L. REv. 723, 748 (1988) (describing justificatio ns fo r a sys tem of adherence to prece de nt). A full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this article.
93 See Evan H. Caminker, H7!)' lviust Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REv. 817, 818 (1994) ("longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always
bo und to follow a precedent established by a court 'superior' to it"); Mo n aghan, supra
r~ote 92, at 754-55 (arguing that, in some sense , a precedent must be binding upo n a
subsequent court, but co ncluding that "binding authority" is a social construct without
sorrte "im1T1utable essence []'' and that th e exte n t to wh ich a precedent is bi nding depends to a large extent on the rcle of s:.are decisis).
94 CJ Michael j. Ge rhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitu tion al Decisiomnaking and
Theory, 60 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 106-09 (1991) (describing ab ili ry of Supreme Court to
weake n its own precedents through distinctions) .
95 See Monaghan, supra note 92 , at 765-67 (discussing degree to which courts can
distinguish precedents to avoid th em ).
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to which its pnor decisions can be overruied. 96 !f. as Justice Marshall has warned, the Court is reducing its fideli ty to established
precedents, 97 it would seem to be inviting lovver courts and legislatures to continne to challenge them."
C
h
11.. rmmoer or recent sc o1ars nave gone even turtner ana
- d mac
.J
t
. £
.
t
'
' . v.;natsoever
'
suggesu:·
m1enor
cour:..S
nave no 1ega.t' GUt)'
to
98
obey h ierarchical precedent," I acknov!ledged , "although I th ink
this is a fa irly radical proposition ."
"1- arr--ep
"o.o~kinp-~diral
can
1i~ trouble ·vou. for ITlOf·P
ol ·~· ui
~a . ·"•o of !Cl
...... ,
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1
that excellent coffee?" Eduardo asked.
" "
•
f' C
'- '
"1;,171-.
•
' •
•
f
lt 1s
a goo o.' co~tee
macmne.
v ~ 11cn v.;e cle oded to get a co·fee machine, we had 30 many debates abou t -..vho would clean it
. l a macmne
, .
.. ...1 ' t reqmre
•
'l
.
t h.at we 1.10. d..< tO nno
t hoat d1un
Cl<H y mamtenann:. The unexpected benefit was that this machine brews each
cu o of coffee on request and to ind ividual specifications. "
"I like my coffee strong and high-test. I'm afraid I share my
brother's addiction to caffeine." 99 Cup in hand, Eduardo continued. "In addition to questions over the extent to which a precedent is binding, I think there's a fair amount of debate over what
aspect of a decision constitutes precedent. Does the precedent
consist of the decision, the rules formulated by the decisionmaker,
and/ or the reasons for those rules?" 100
''I'm afraid the coffee break threw me off," I said. "\Vhy are
we d ebating the meaning of precedent?"
''I'm trying to understand the effect of vacatur on precedent,"
.
Eduardo exolained,
"and I'm havinatrouble 'IVith your
character0
1
'
ization of vacatur as destroying the precedential value of a decision. Unlike preclusion, where a d ecision either is or is not bindH A
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96 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Payne v. T e nn essee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
97 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619, 2623 n.2 (Marshali, J., dissenting) (describing a variety
of Supreme Court decis ions as "endangered precedents").
98 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 93, at 820-21 (desc iibing recent academi c ch alle nges to the doctrine of hierarchical precedem); Gary Lawson, The Constituiional Case Against
Preceden t, 17 HARV. JL. & PUB . POL'>' 23 ( 1994) (claiming that fidelity to the Constitution
is more important than fidelity to precedent); lV!ichael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice:
Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 85
(1990) (arguing that it is nei th er insubordinate n or im proper for a !ower court to re pudia te th e precedent of a higher co urt).
99 See Delgado, lwdrigo 's Eighth Chronicle, supra n ote ! , at 524 (describing Rodrigo 's
lol'e of coffee).
100 See Monaghan, supra note 92, at 763-57 (describing th e problem of d e fining precedent and the implica tions of diffei·ent approaches).
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ing, precedent strikes me as a more flexible concept. This leads
me to conclude that vacated d e cisions can still have a role in the
development of the lmv through precedent. "
"That goes back to my point that decisions have informational
value as weli as precedential value ," I said. "The many published
volumes of the Federal Supplement bear testimony to the importance
of'judicial decisions beyond th eir role as precedent. The market
demonstrated by LEXIS and vVESTLAW for unreported and unpublished decisions, many of which expressly lack preceden tial
value, 10 1 orovides further evide nce that the informational content
'
of decisions is important."
"'Nhat exactly do you mean by informational content?" asked
Eduardo.
'J udicial opi nions have persuasive val ue, provide analysis for
future courts , and explain the application of the law to future
transactions. In o ther words, they explain the law."
"I agree that decisions provide a public value through their
legal analysis," Eduardo said. "But I think the informational value
of decisions extends beyond that analysis, which relates to my
point about the definition of precedent. Judicial decisions announce what the law is."
"What do you mean?'' I asked.
"We 've already talked about the fact that courts make law,
however one characterizes the process."
''Yes, and judicial precedents are the articulation of judgemade law, in the same way that statutes constitute the law that
results from the legislative process," I responded.
"Under positivism that's true," 102 Eduardo agreed. "I don't
think positivism is useful for analyzing the law that results from
judicial decisions. An opinion isn't constructed like a statute. It

101 Un published decisions are reproduc ed on LEXIS and WESTLAW despite court
rules that, in man y cases, limit or forbid th eir citation in subsequent litigation and deny
them preceden tial value. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman , The
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978) (describing limited citation and non-publi cation rules in the federal courts of app eal). A trend to pe rmit broader citation of unpublished opinions appears to be developing. See Richard C. Reuben, New Cites for Srm Eyes,
A.B.A. J., Jun e 1994, at 22 (reporting that the Tenth Circuit recently joined the Sixth
Circuit as the only fede ral a ppeals courts to allow citation of unpublished opinions). This
development does not, however, affect the use of such opinions as precedent. !d. (quoting Stephanie K Seymour, Chief judge of the Tenth Circuit, as stating that unpublish ed
opinions "are not binding and have only persuasive authority").
102 See, e.g., jEFFRIE G. MURPHY & jULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 19-33 (rev.
ed. 1990) (defining positivis m) .

1994 ]

VAN ISHING PRECEDENT

349

doesn't have the same clear scope of application to future situations."
"But judges clearly do articulate legal ndes."
"The legal rules we deduce from judicial opinions don't really
co me from the court 's description of the rule. I th ink it's more
accurate to describe judicial lawmaking as common law adj udication," Eduardo suggested.
"How is that different?" I asked.
"Common Jaw adjudication involves the development of legal
rules through generalization from a series of analogies. 103 In
order to find the rule applicable to a given transaction, we look at
the cases to locate similar transactions. In other words, cases give
us a series of discre te examples of the application of a general
principle to a fact patte rn. The examples themselves provide the
meaning for the general rule."
"That sounds like a fairly accurate way of describing th e use
of precedent," I acknowledged.
"The general principle extends beyond the adjudicative process," Eduardo conceded. "The process of developing the meaning
of a rule from a series of discrete examples has been explored by
everyone from Wittgenstein to Sesame Street."
"Okay, let's start with the easy one. How is adjudication like
Sesame Street?'' I asked.
"Martha Min ow, I think, is the source of this explanation. 104
Minow explains that the little game they play on Sesame
Street-'one of these things is not like the others'-exemplifies
the type of analysis used by lawyers. What she means, I think, is
that when we use case research to find the rule of law applicable
to a particular situation we look for cases that are similar in relevant aspects to that situation. When presented by an opposing
precedent, we seek to distinguish it by saying it is 'not like the
others' in the relevant way:"
"I remember hearing about the reference to Sesame Street.
Didn't Minow discuss this in an address to the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools?" 105 I asked.

103 See Linda Meye r, "Nothing We Say Matters:" T eague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L.
REv. 423, '165-76 (1994) (desc ribing the character of common-law adjudication ).
104 See MARTHA MINO\'.', MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: IN CLUS IO N, EXCLUSION AND
AMERIC.-\.1'\ U.w 1 (1990) (desc ribing the game playe d on Sesame Street as reflecting how
lawyers thin!<.).
105 Minow has used th e example in several o f her works, including a speech given
before the Association of Ame rican Law Schools at its annual meeting on January 4,
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"I don't know rhe exact source , but Minow' s point is that
l re asomng
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.
b y an a logy, "E
'
rc:asonmg
_•cluara' o responaed. "Minmv went on to consider the difficulties with this reasoning
u
process, particularly the problem with determining when a g iven
case was or was not 'lik-e th e others.' In oth er words, when does
differen ce rnatter?"
'"'four point then \s the existence of past decisions ma tters,
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h . manner tnroughout
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.
the process 01 unaerstan u n g co n cepts m Lds
much of Philosophical lnvesiigations."' 06
"I thought you weren't an academic. I admit that I'm a little
surprised to hear a legal se r vices lavvyer citing Wittgenstein."
"I am a Crenshaw, after all," 107 Eduardo reminded me. "I
was also a math major m college. For a mathematician,
vVittgenstein's writing is parti cu larly fascinating. Both his material
on the meaning of language and his mathematical examples demonstrate that a series of exam ples can convey u nders tanding even
of concepts for which a formal rule cannot be articulated. Think
about how we understand the meaning of the color 'green.' Can
you define green? Not easily. But you can convey the concept of
green quite readily through a serie s o f exam ples."
"I d on't think green is a concept. "
"Okay, so I'm not as much of a philosopher as my brother,"
Eduardo admitted. "Le t's try to avoid the q uagmire of p hilosophito a
cai debate . The idea is thaE som e th in g:s that are not subiect
J
precise definition can nonetheless be understood through exam1
,
p1es.
"And the r11ore examples you have , th e better your understanding of the underlying concept. I see whe re you're goinp; with
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- - - - - · - - - - ·-------- - -·- --------------1991. For the text of this speec h, see l\·lanha Minow, Diffenmces Among Difference, l UCLA
LJ. 165 (1991 ).
l 06 See generally LUDWIG \N!TIGENSTE I>I,
PHiLOSO PHICAL INVESTIGAT IO NS (G.E.M.
Anscombe trr.ns.) (Macmillan 3d uL 1969) !explaining that o ur un de rsta n d ing of th e
:iT1eaning of lvords, rul es , and other ah~ {rac~ ions is de r1ved from genera lization abo ut
discrete events).
lOi Ed uardo 's siblings are ex u·em e!y well read ~md cite to such authoricies with ease .
See, e.g., Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fijih Chronicle, su,trra note !, at 1585-1605 (in wh ich Rod:-igo
discusse3 Ari stotle and Hegel).
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this. If the informational content of d ecisions 1s so substantial,
.
h
.
, ,
remov1ng L1em 1s costly.
"Exactly," Eduardo agreed. "The problem I have with this
anrument
is that, if the cases are relevant for their informational
0
content rather than their technical value as precedent, vacatur
l
.
"
•
•
.
' ;
'
1
l , ) -'
seen1s re1at1ve1y
~ess 1rnportar1L vacat1ng a case S110u. d.n t uestroy
1
;ts
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the 11se c)f vacated decision.s for TJreclt.tsior:l rr1ay affect a COllrt's
willingnescs to rely on o. vac21.ted case for its precedential and / or
inforrnation.al conte11l~,, I re p lied.. ~~'"i!\ rnore serious concer11 is that
vacatur is usually connected to other methods of hiding or erasing
an
opmwn ,
such
as
depublication,
withd ravval
or
108
expungement.''
"You mean the vacated opm10n actually disappears from the
"d' uaruo
..J
)
d..
case reporters:'"" L"
asKe
"Precisely. If the judgment is vacated before the publication of
the permanent reporter volume, there will simply be a citation in
the published volume indicated that the opinion, previously published at that location in the advance sheet, has been vacated." 109
"But even unpublish e d opmwns appear on LEXIS and

WESTL'\.W."
"Both on-line reporting SeYVlces have similar policies to that of
West and will usually remove 110 cases that are vacated and do not

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----·----108 See Transcript, Kaisha, sujlra note 24, at 37 (question by Justice Ginsburg indicating that, if vacated opinion is caught in time, it will not be published in the o!Ticial
reporters).
109 For an illustrati on of this process, see the follm,•ing ent;'}' in th e offici al reporter:
EDITOR'S NOTE: The opinion of ti1e United States District Court, S.D.N.Y.,
l'vfason Tenders Council Welfare Ftmd v. A.haty Consiruction Curp., published in the
advance sheet at this citation, 724 F. Supp. 209·n4. was withdrawn from the
bound volume because the opmwn was vacated and withdrawn by order of the
Court.

724 F. Supp. 209. As this example illustrates, unless a researcher had examined (and pre·
served) the \;Vest advance sheer;.;, she woltld be unlikely to cliscover that this case involved
the relitigation of an issue \' tch had been decided in an eariier lawsuit involving the
san1e plaintiff. The prior lav,:..uit had Cllso been va cated. f·,'1ason Tenders .Dist. Council
\\relfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F. Supp. 1309. vacated upon request of the parties, 648 F. Supp.
1318 (S.D.i'-l.Y. 1986).
110 The on·line services have procedures for determining which cases are placed on·
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appear in the official reporters. 111 Of course, if vacatur is d elayed
until the case is published in the bound volume of the re porter,
the opinion will remain available. But vacatur has the potential to
destroy even the informational value of a case by causing it to
disappear without a trace. 112
"So even if the Supreme Court were to decid e to accord
precedential value to vacated opinions, future litigants might be
unable to fin d the relevant prece dents?" Ed uardo asked.
"That's right."
"I suppose litigants could also take the next logical step and
provide in their settlement agreement that the motion to vacate
will also seek depublication or with d rawal of any preliminary published opinion," 113 Eduardo observed.
"If a court is willing to grant vacatur on the theory th at it
promotes settlement, I expect it would be equally receptive to a
motion to depublish," 114 I said.
"Isn't there a way that future beneficiaries of the decision can
prevent its destruction by objecting to vacatur or intervening m
the motion to vacate?"
"Courts face one obvious difficulty m ruling on motions to

line. They report that they sometimes continue to publish cases that have been vacated.
See Resnik, "Whose Judgment?, supra note 50, at 1497-1500 (describing publishing practices
of LEX IS and vVESTLAW). It is rare to find a case included on-line that has been removed from the official reporter.
111 See Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 620 n.l63 (describing the general
practice whereby vacated opinions are withdram1 from the online Reporting Services
(LEXIS and WESTLAW) as well as from the bound editions of the federal reporter).
112 Because vacated cases can be rendered invisible, it is impossible to determine the
extent to which useful decisions are being destroyed. For example, one commentator has
been misled into arguing that the relitigation costs associated with vacatur are insubsL'intial because of the absence of reported decisions involving relitigation. Henry E.
Klingeman, Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FORDHAM L. REV.
233, 249-50 (1989). As the previous example demonstrates, the destructive effect of vacatur makes this conclusion unreliable.
113 See, e.g., Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436 (1Oth Cir. 1993) (indicating that the parties' settlement agreement contemplated withdrawal of the court's opinion
as well as vacatur).
114 Publication of federal court opinions is at the discretion of the judge rendering
the opinion. The vast majority of trial court opinions are not published. See Jack B.
Weinstein, Factors in Determining the Degree of Public Availability of judicial O;binions, 2 N.Y.U.
E!'.'VTL. LJ. 244 (1993) (describing publication system and factors considered by judges in
publication decision). Some state systems of depublication are more elaborate. For example, the California rules of court allow the California Supreme Court to order that a
lower court opinion not be published. CAL R. CT. 976(c) (2) ("An opinion certified for
publication shall not be published . . . on an order of the Supreme Court to that effect."); see Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 192 n.7 (describing California's
depublication rules); Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1239 n.lOO (same).
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vacate: determining the significance of the decision for future litigants. For example, the Ninth Circuit's balancing test requires the
court to consider the impact on future litigants and suggests that
vacatur is impro per if the d ecision has substantial precedential or
preclusive value. But how is the court to ascertain the future value
of the decision? Future beneficiaries are seldom presen t before
the court; they may not even be aware of the d ecision." 115
"If the future parties can somehow be located , are they permitted to defend the decision's precedential or preclu sive value in
the context of the court's ruling on the motion? "
"Sometimes," I replied. "1n one fairly recent case, the Ninth
Circuit allowed intervention by th ird parties who eventually benefited from the collateral estoppel effect of the decision. 116 In
Kaisha, on the other hand, the Fede ral Circuit d enied Kaisha's
motion to intervene to oppose vacatur, and the Supreme Court
ultimately dismissed the case for lack of standing." 117
"An attempt by a third party to intervene does present an
unusual standing issue," Eduardo o bserved. "On one hand, the
standing doctrine articulated in Lujan 118 would seem to preclude
intervention. Subsequent litigation by or against third parties
would seem to be the kind of 'conjectural' harm 119 that does not
give rise to a case or controversy, 120 especially since it would be
difficult for a court, in ruling on a motion to vacate, to ascertain
whether its decision will actually be given preclusive effect in a
later proceeding, the parameters of which have not yet been determined."121

115 This was one basis for the Second Circuit's refusal to allow the potential interest
by third parties in the preclusive value of the decision to defeat a motion for vacatur. See
Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding the interests
of "hypothetical" future litigants to be speculative).
116 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1989).
117 The Supreme Court found that Kaisha had failed to presen·e for review the propriety of the Court of Appeals' denial of the motion to intervene. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 428 (1993). In dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that the inteiVention issue was fairly included in the question presented for certiorari and further, that if routine vacatur was improper, Kaisha had a
sufficient stake in the outcome of the motion to vacate to justifY intervention. !d. at 429
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
119 !d. at 2136 (explaining constitutional minimum of standing as including requirement that plaintiff's injury be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical")
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
120 !d. ("[T)he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of
the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.").
121 !d. (explaining standing requirement that it be "likely" as opposed to "speculative"
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"£"-Jm-, smce the first court cannot control the subsequent
preclusion decision, does the potential harm from vacatur appear
to be redressable. 122 The first court cannot reqmre a la ·i:er court
to ap ply collateral estoppel, even if it has refused to vacate," I
said.
''On the other hand, the third parties potentially affected by
th e Clecision tc~ vacate are really rnore le,gitimate clefenders o f the
.JUdgment
'
' ongma
. . 1 1"ltlgants,
.
,.· .t-uuarco
1 contmuecL
.
1
Lnan
tne
"\Vh at do you mean?''
"A motion to vacate doesn ' t present the n o rmal adve rsarial
·•
•·
'
.
i
•
Slttla
Ll·On, "1ns t ea d o_.f nav1ng
one par .t.),. ,o n eac1:t Sl·C~e
01c L.ne
1ssue,
.
1
1
..,...
lndeea, l
b oit'o pai-tles support, or at 1east accept, vacatur.
wo u ld think that a 'l'nnning litigant •Nould be able to cE:xtract a
h
C
•
more J:avorable settlement m exc,ange
10r 1ts support o:t vacatur.
Th is gives both parties an incentive to persuade the court that
vacatur is desirable and leaves no one to d efend the j udgment."
"In fact, I've heard of a case where that's just what happened," 1 agreed. "An insurance pollution case resulted in a finding that the insurance company was liable. The case was then
settled and vacated. 124 Through an unusual circumstance, the
terms of the settlement came to light seven years later in another
litigation, and it was revealed that the defendant insurance company had agreed in the settlement to pay $200,000 more than the
amount of the plaintiff's claim in order to destroy the adverse
district court judgment." 125
"Unfortunately, no t every decision worth defending has potential preclusive value," Eduardo went on. "Even if courts internret
the ir~jury requirement of Lujan sufficiently broadly to grant standing to litigants seeking to preserve the collateral estoppel effect of
a judgment, there won't be anyone to d efend a decision that is
simply an important precedent. Intervention fo r that purpose
~
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that plaintiffs injury "will be redressed by a favorable decision.") (citations and internal
quo tations omitted).
122 !d. at 2140-42 (describing the redressabilit:y requirement of sianding); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978) (sam.~).
123 Indeed. counsel for Bonner Mall acknowledged at oral argument that his defense
of the I'-.linth Circuit decision was not based on the partnership's future inte rest in the
decision and that he was really arguing as a "friend of the Court." Transcript, Bonner
lvial!, supra note 31, at 47-48.
124 Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 37l, vacated,
621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.NY. 1981).
125 See Intel Corp. v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. ll 71, 1192 n.32
(N.D. CaL l9S8) (describing terms of settlement agreement in Bankers Trust).
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-V\rou1d certainly be denied for lac1..:. of 5L~nding . " 125

"A litigant or future litigant's interest in 8. precedent presumably does not constitute the type of tangib le interest that gives rise
to standing," 127 I observed. "AJlmving intervention on this basis
would open the courthouse doors by groxmng standing to
nonparties for the purpose of app ealing decisio ns with wh ich they
disagree, as well as prolonging the app e llaH~ process beyond the
"
'
resolutiO
n 01.f:' tne mspute.
ba;:- Sl):Ch claims," Eduardo
resnonde-d. i'Btlt if see king to d.::feD.·d .a jtJ (lgrn:::.~t because o f its
1
1
,
,
rr•
•
£
...
preceaent1a1 va ue 1s an m surnoent t n terest to conLer standmg,
doesn' t the converse hold true? Viould n't Article III prevent 1itiga::lts from seeking- and courts fro m grantin g-vacatur of a settled case for the purpose of destroying its p:recedemial effect? 129
And isn't the co urt's order in such a case m erely an advisory opinion with respect to the con tinuing value of the decision as precedent?"130
"Put that way, vacatur seems even less defe nsible," I agreed.
"It really seems as if routine vacatur allows the parties to create a
market in precedents. And part of the point of a system of precedent is that the parties don't have to keep coming back to court
on the same issue."
1.
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126 See In re Smith, 964 F.2d 635. 538 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing fact that allowing
intervention by litiga nts simply seeking to attack or defend the precedential value of a
decision would violate Article III).
127 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-95 (1974).
128 Litigation by no n parties about the precedentiai val ue of a decision would appear
to be litigation about the opinion rather than th e judgment to which it is attache d, because the inter,e nors are not aggrieved by th e j udgment. See Transcript, Kaisha, supra
note 24, at 34 (argument by appellee distinguishing betwee n vaca ting opinions and vacating a judgment); id. at 36 (question by Justice Ginsburg) ("'v\r;"lat would the sta tus of a n
opinion st;-ipped of the underlying- of the ultimate judgment be?") ; id. (answer by appellee to subseque nt questi on by Justice Scalia) ("the precede ntial e tTect . . . comes from
the judgment, not from the opinion. that the opinion is the rationale behind the judgment, but the judgment is what is the precedentia l effect'").
129 See New Jersey v. He!dor Indus., 989 F.2d 702, 710 (3d Cir. 1993) (Nygaard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (basis of appeal or motion to vacate is an o rder, not an opinion; federai courts do not have the power to vacate an opinion where a party is not
aggrieved by th e order to which it is attached).
130 Cf Reic h v. Co n tractors Welding, 996 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 (2d Cir. 1993) (The
Occ upational Safety and Health Review Commission sought to preserve the unde rlying
reasoning o f a vacated o rd er ?.s valid p;-ecedent, based on it.s conclusion that, in spite of
ihe vaca tu r which resulted from settlemeN, i!:S analysis in th e dec ision re mained co rrect.
Because th e Commission 's opinion was issued after th e parties had reached a se ttl e ment,
the court concluded that it constituted an improper and unauthorized advisor/ opinion.).
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"No t just the parties," Eduardo corrected me. "Remember
your point that third parties benefit from a judicial decision , both
through preclusion and prece dent. Presumably that means third
parties can also suffer from an adverse decision."
"Third parties can't be bound by principles of preclusion if
th ey weren't a party to the lawsuit," I reminded him.
"They could be considerably affected by an adverse precedent,
th ough. I would think that certain litigants or industry grou ps wh o
expect to contest particu lar issues regularly ·would have a substantiai stake in the develooment of case law in their area and would
be willing to pay to make that development more favorable." 131
''You're saying an industry group or institutional litigant unconnected with a particular lawsuit would get involved financially
in order to control the development of case law that would affect
it in the future?" 132 I asked.
"Why not? Even if the losing litigant isn't a repeat player and
is therefore unconcerned whether the precedent remains on the
books, there is nothing to preclude a third party interested in the
precedent but otherwise unrelated to the litigation from contributing the money necessary to effectuate a settlement on appeal for
the purpose of having the precedent vacated."
"So
you
think
routine
vacatur
would
operate
disproportionately to favor wealthy litigants," I said.
"Absolutely. The legal system is already skewed in favor of the
wealthy, who have greater access to the courts and to legal advice.
Precedent allows those with a lesser degree of access to enjoy the
benefits of legal rules. Through vacatur, those who are likely to
face an issue repeatedly in litigation can eradicate or at least retard the development of unfavorable rules and then argue to the
courts that the weight of authority is in their favor." 133
"T here is clear evidence of insurance companies purposefully
using vacatur in precisely this way," I added. 134 "And I'm sure it
is equally possible in other industries." 135
~

131 See Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1242-43 (describing interest of institutional litigants in controlling the development of precedent).
132 See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 Lo.w & Soc'v REv. 95 (1974) (describing litigation objectives of "repeat players"
as including development of particular regime of rules as well as case-specific outcomes).
133 See Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1242 (citing arguments used by institutional
litigants about the "weight of authority").
134 See Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 205-07 (describing efforts of insurance
industry to control development of insurance law through vacatur and related practices).
135 See, e.g., Respondent's Brief, Bonner Mall, supra note 46, at 35 n.19 (suggesting
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'Thin k of how interested the tobacco industry would be, for
example , in maintain ing a record of successfully defending all
claims against it and erasing any decision imposing liability. 136 By
erasing and hiding any a~verse decision, the industry perpetuates
the myth that smoking isn't dangerous and that tobacco compan ies aren't responsible for its harms. The cost for the industry
would be tiny, and the effect would be a manipulation of the
j udicial system."
"vVby do you consider it manipulation?" I inquired.
"Of course it is manipulation for weal thy re peat litigants to
buy and sell j udicial precedents," Eduardo exclai med . "I admit to
a bias against well funded institutional litigants, because so much
of my p ractice is based on trying to redress th e damage they do
to the poor and uninformed, but I don't think I'm wrong about
vacatur favoring the rich. Only a litigant with substantial funds can
afford settlement and vacatur. A poor litigant unhappy with a
lower court decision is forced to hope his or her appeal will be
su.ccessful. Some litigants can't even afford the cost of that ap1"
pea.
"That's true," I admitted. "On the other hand, a poor litigant
who is successful at the trial level may benefit from the availability
of vacatur. Consider, for example, the case of George Neary, who
sued the University of California and won a multimillion dollar
ve rdict at trial. ;37 The case dragged on for twelve years before
trial, and Neary, who was getting on in age, was tired of the litigation. When the defendants agreed to settle the case pending appeal,138 Neary was ha ppy to agree to the settlement, which would
both reduce the uncertainty of collecting, prevent him from incurring further litigation costs, and, most importantly, get him the
money right away." 139

that a banking industry trade group interested in erasing the lower court precedent
could easily contribute the money necessary to effectuate a settlement on appeal even if
U.S. Bancorp itself was uninterested in seeking vacatur).
136 See Fisch. Rewriting HistOJ)', supra note 5, at 622 n.174 (describing successful track
record of tobacco industry in cigarette litigation).
137 The jury verdict was seven million dollars. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278
Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
138 The settlement was conditioned on the court granting the parties' motion for
stipulated reversal of the jury verdict. The California Court of Appeals refused to grant
the motion. See Neary, 278 Cal. Rptr. 773. Its decision was reversed by the California Supreme Court. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
139 See Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 198-99 (describing the Neary litigation);
Loudenslager, supra note 71 , at 1238-42 (same).
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"Don't you see how vacatur simply mcreases a wealthy
defendant's ability to make use of his or her leverage? The cost of
litigation, the further cost and delay of the ap pellate process,
already operate to favor the wealthy. 'With vacatur available, the
one potential downside for a litigant who refuses to settle before
trial-the risk of an unfavorable adverse judgment with conse··
i
quences exten d..mg 'oeyona_, +h e presenc+ case-h as oeen rernoven.l r'>
litigant wi th the resources to pursu e litigation can outv,;ait :Jn adversary, secure in the knowledge that if it goes to trial and loses , it
can erase the consequenct:s."
"You seem to be assuming that settl·ement and vacatur sten1
from a litigant's unjustified failure to settle promptly. Thinl'. for .?,
moment a bout the counterargument, " I pressed. "Couldn' t settlement on aDr1..JC:al result, in part, from the facr that the !mver court
decision is aberrational? 140 If the successful litigant rec ogmzes
that the victory is un likely to survive ap peal, he or she has a greater incentive to settle . Moreover, the losing litigant may be willing
to pay some amount in settlement, even if the prospects on appeal look good, to avoid further litigation costs. In these cases,
settlement operates as a form of com promise verdict. 1 ~ 1 By allow1

L

1

L

140 Brainerd Currie's famous railroad hypmhetical illustrates one possibie problem
with maintaining erroneous judgments: the possibility that such a judgment will unfairly
operate to preclude a party who has repeatedly defended itself successfully in rnulti-pany
or repeat litigation . See Brainerd Currie, Alutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doclline, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 ( 1957) (describing example of litigant who, having
been successful in defending twenty-five lawsuits, loses the rwenty-sixth and is thereafter
precluded from defending itself on the basis of o!1ensiYe non mutual collateral estoppel).
To the extent that this result is unfair, the problem 3eems to lie primarily with the application of collateral estoppel to multiple-plaintiff lawsuits. See lVIichael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill it.; Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in [isbesios
Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 144-45 (1934) (suggesting it may be inappropriate to
apply offensiYe collateral estoppel to asbestos litigation).
141 We might expect to be able to distinguish these compromises by the terms of the
settlement. See, e.g., Transcript, Bonner Mall, supra note 31, at 10 (counsel for U.S.
Bancorp characterizing settlement in which losing party "essentially pays the full <mwunt
of the judgment" as "in fact not a settlement"). But see Purcell v. Bankatlantic Fin. Corp.
(S.D. Fla) (Nos. 89-1284, 89-1605, 89-1850), discussed supra notes 79-82. In Purcdl. the
losing party characterized the settlement as a compromise even though it had agreed to
pay the fu ll amount of the jury verdict. See Plaintiffs' Responsive Memorandurn , Levan. mpra note 71, at 5-6 (characterizing settlement as a compromise because the settlement
amount was substantially less than the original amount in controversy); Defendants'
Opening Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment upon Magistrate Judge's Reconsideration Thereof at 6, Levan v. C8pital Cities/ABC, Inc. (S.D . Fla.)
(No. 92-0325-CIV-ATKINS) ("The Stipulation of Settlement . . . calls for Levan and BFC
to pay the class eight million doliars-the full amount of the damages assessed by the
jury against them in the securities fraud action.").
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mg vac:crtur, we permit the parties not to manipulate but to rid
the sysiem of weak or erroneous cases more efficien tly than
tnroug11 appea 1.. "
"VV~hy should vve allow the litigants to
that judgment?"
Edv.ardo persisted. "If litigants are unwilling to settle prior to trial
b·ecause o f the novel ty or com plexity of the issues presented, can
>Ne trust them to determine at the time of appeal that there is
son1ethin2"
wrong with the trial court's decision? It seems to be
u
that
litigants' o penness to settlemem is far more likeiy to be
i n fi; ' ""«c,~ d hv resoqrrrs
•vil1ii1(:rr;,=s;;'--' >o
continue litigation, con're-,.<: ~ h"''lt timing of <l'-lV f'"li"'f an·-'i so on-like your earlier
..:::>)r:l-...-~,
~ -~
.ooro-p
"
''-"'c.1ll} J ,C UJ. 'C'a·- -1\~.,.~· ea-~y
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"Surely the likelihood of success upon appeal will also be a
factcJr,': I insisted.
"Even if we believe that litigants vacate only in hard cases with
aberrational results, we cannot condone that process. First, I don't
trust the litigants, particularly in difficult cases, to recognize an
aberrational result. 142 'Would you consider the recent verdict
against 1\!IcDonald s aberrational?"
"You mean the case in which the jury awarded almost three
million dollars in punitive damag~..:s because it found McDonalds'
coffee too hot? 143 It's certainly a weird result," I agreed.
"But d oes that suggest vacatur of the judgment is particularly
appropriate if the parties now settle? Second, hard cases involve
precisely the expenditure of time and effort that justifies preservation of the result. These are the cases in which the public informational value of the decisions is so important."
"V!hat about the saying that hard cases make bad law?" I
asked .
"Prooonents of vacatur would like us to believe that. 14 "1 But a
1

1<2 See \Nashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 1. One Parcel of Land, No. HAR 88618, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18485, at *12 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 1993) (observing, in conneccion with its rdusal to vacate, that "perhaps this Court erred in its interpretation or
application of the la:w concerning se\'erance ch!n1agcs, but that is a determination properly left for the Fou rth Circuit, not pri\'at.e agreen1ent.").
143 Stt, e.g., Big Jury Award for Coffee Bum, N.Y. Tli\1:-:S, Aug. 19, 1994, at DS (describing verdict); Jury Says Coffee Vl·i<s too Hot, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1994, at lB (same).
The jury verdin was subsequently :·educed by the coun. See Cowt Refuses to Raise Award
Spili, CHL TRJB., Oct. 14, 1994, at 3; see also Michael S. Froman, Spilled and
B<!med: Nc;t Open anr! Siwt, CHI. D.\ILY L Bl!LL, Oct. 13, 1994, at 6 (describing factors
that influence jury Yerdicts).
144 Vacan.1r returns a difficult legal issue to its former state of ambiguity. This result
has been defended on the basis that it is better to have an issue unresolved than re-
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litigant can always argue to a subsequent court that the prior
decision is unreliable . And for decisional law to develop, o u r system must retain the novel cases, which are often the hard cases.
Vacatur is unnecessary in cases in which the result is obvious, and
those cases are likely to be settled be fore trial anyway. "
"Th a t' s t rue ," I agree d . "Th
r
. ·1 cases go to
_ e reason so rew
CJVJ
trial is that litigation costs reduce the value of the judgment for
both litigants. If the parties can agree on a range of possi b!e o utcomes, settlement is the economically effi cien t so lut ion." '' ~
"So if a case goes to trial, it is often because the litigants had
very different expectations about the likely result. 116 In that case,
one side is likely to view the result as ab erration a1." 147
"vVhich may be how the govern me n t views the result in you r
case. Speaki ng of your case, we sh ould get back to it. I may be
able to avoid preparing for class, but eventually I have to go teach
it."

solved inco rrec tly. Commentators have ide ntified a value, however, in we ll-developed and
predictable rules of law which is distin ct from thtl law's substantive content. Fo r example,
the well-developed and predictable n ature of Delaware corporation law has been described as a rationale for incorporatin g in Delaware regardless of whether Delaware's
rules are su bstantively superior. See, e.g. , Barry E. Adler, Financial and Polilical Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 339 (1993); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Stn1Ct11re of Cmporation Law, 89 COLU1v!. L. REv. 146 1, 1508 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geofffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 469, 505-09 (1987).
145 See, e.g. , Rich ard A. Posner, An Econom ic Approach to Legal Procedure and }Hdicinl
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STU D. 399, 417-18 & n.27 (1973) (nvo parties with a ny common
bargaining range "rarely" fail to settle ); George L. Priest & Benjamin Kle in , The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (" In litigation, as in gambling,
agreement over the outcome leads parties to drop out.").
146 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White , Economic Anal)'sis of Private Antitmst
Litigation, 74 CEO. LJ. 1001, 1027 (1986) (uncertainty about th e outcome of a trial
makes the parties less likely to se ttl e); Cla ire Finkelstei n , No te , Financial Distress as a
Noncooperative Game: A Proposal for Overcoming Obstacles to Private Workouts, 102 YALE LJ.
2205, 2211 (1993) (suggesting that possible explanation for low level of settlem e nt in
Chapte r 11 litigation is existence of greater uncertainty about bankruptcy law); see also
Lucian Bebc huk, Litigation and Settlem<nt Under Imperfect Information, 15 Ro\ND J. ECON. 404
(1984).
147 This leads to the question of how th e parti es' expectations are atTected by trial.
Economists ofte n assum e that trial resolves the un certainty associa ted with a nove l legal
position or disputed issue of fact, allowing the parties to agree on a post-t rial settlement
range. See Fisc h , Rewriting History, s11p ra note 5, at 635. It is possible for one or both parties, h owever, to \~ew th e trial court judgment as aberrational. Such an assessment is
likel y to affect the post-tri al se ttlemen t process.
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FACING THE FACT OF VACATUR-EDUARDO CONSIDERS HOW
TO

DEAL

WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST

"I appreciate your taking all this time to talk with m e abou t
vacatur. Hopefully it isn't at the expense of your students,"
Eduardo said. "But even u nderstanding the general principles of
vacatur, I'm not sure how to respond to the government's request."
"vVhy is the government seeking vacatur of the trial court
decision?" I asked. "Since the case was resolved, the government
can't be concerned about res judicata, as it was in JvJ.unsingwear.
And the doctrine of nonmutual collateral esto ppel d oesn 't apply
to the government, 148 so the other potential litigants can't make
preclusive use of your case."
"I think the government is primarily concerned about the
influence of this d ecision in su bsequent cases," Eduardo m used.
''You probably hit th e nail on the head when you said the government views the case as aberrational. The government attorneys
have repeatedly warned me that the case will not stand up on
appeal."
"Even though the case is not technically binding as precedent,
it is likely to be influential because it breaks new legal ground. If
the decision remains on the books, it makes it more difficult for
the government to take a contrary approach in a subseque nt case.
The government has been extremely conscious of the difficulty of
continuing to espo use legal arguments that have been rej ected by
the courts, and this concern has led it to become a major defender of postsettlement vacatur."
"So the government's request in my case is not unusual?"
Eduardo asked.
"Quite the contrary. 149 Not only does the government have
substantial experience with vacatur as a litigan t, but it has championed routine vacatur as an amicus in Kaisha and Bonner Mall."
"I would h ave thought the governm ent would have opposed
vacatur, based on the factors we discussed earlier, as contrary to
the public interest in preserving the fin ality of decisions and conserving judicial resources," Eduardo said.

148 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1 984) .
149 See, e.g. , Stipul a tion [of Settlement before th e District Co urt] at 10, Appe ndix to
J o int Motion, Schoolcraj':, supra note 8 (conditioning se ttl emen t on vacatur of lower court
decisions).
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"That '.Vas my initial reac tion as well," I admitted. "Apoarentlv
'
.
. .
1
tne governments
mterests
as a ,.!. 1t1gaLI
overroce
any ne:ec.1 to d e150
fend the public values threatened by vacatur.
In explaini ng its
• •
1
,.....,
.....--,
\....
1 . ., .,
.
pos1t10n to tne ~upreme L.ourt, tHe government exp amea tnat 1t
'is a party to a far gr eater number Df cases on a nationwide basis
thar1 even the rr.tost litigio11S privC~. t e ::ntity. "' 15 1
'l
' " I1 d
· ~~o tne gov•=rnm~=nt 1s tl1e ciasslc ·repeat p1ayer,
L uar d o
.;J.!.

/

'

'f.--.

'

·-~sno·nrl
lL l
...1.1 u e
. . . a' .

•

·~

-

'

'

152

;~ie s, and you.r victory ·~viJl mak.e it f-1arder for th(e gover11ment
r:i
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• '
'
.h
'
.
'
. .
.
to '""eal
wnn
tn·e
o.om,::iess
m
stmseq
uen t ,ntigatlOn
. 'I
:..ou recogn1· ze u'
that by characterizing you:: case 2s zc significant victory not just for
P',~,-,p·,-al"
...
Yo llf clients b,t f r •r th"'- nom e 1PSS : n 0.._
"~
'
.
k
h
'
~~
'
' auout
'h
1 tnm
Lat s :accurate. J. ne c ase senas
a message b otn
the rights of the homeless and th e abiliry of the poor to prevail
•
'
agamst
tne
power anu.J resources m the government. 1 suppose that
message is wh a t the government is tl-ying to take away. If the decision is vacated, the government vrill try to proceed against other
homeless people the same way it proceeded against my clients."
"That's right," I said. "Of course, other homeless tenants
could always make the same argument that you made."
"The homeiess have limite d legal services available to them. I
think we were fortunate in b eing able to raise and litigate this
issue successfully, but I'm not confidant that the average pro bono
lawyer will be able to make the case successfully with no available
precedent. I wou ld h o pe the existence of this decision would encourage them to try," Eduardo said.
"If you believe the issue is worth defending on behalf of the
homeless, why not simply refuse to settle? You said that your original clients had already been given adequate housing, so you aren' t
1
.
'
.
,
compe 11 eu_, to agree to sett.ement
and vacatur on tne1r account.
"If we don
. ' t settle,
" L1e
1"! l pursue us
. a p p ea 1,"
government w1.
Eduardo explained. "l\tiy firs t problem with that is my reluctance
to devote additional resources to a case when the needs of our
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150 Alternatively, th e government's position may be defended on th e basis of the
value of acceding to the parties' wishes and p romoting settlement. See U.S. A.micus Brief,
Kaisha, supra note 8S, at 15 (arguing that va cz;.tur prorr. o tes settlement); id. at 27 (arguing that parties' imerest in resoh~ng dispLlt·~ outweigh s :my public interest in the d ecision).
151 !d. at 1 (quoting United States v. Mendozo, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (198L1)); U.S. Amicus Brief, Bonner Mall, sujrra note 23, at 1.
152 Professor Resnik describes the government as a "repeat player par excellence."
Resnik, Whose judgment ?, s1~pra note 5D, at 1489.
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tenants have been met. It's iaudable to defend cases on the
grounds of principle or to make the world a better place for future claimants, but the Legal Services Cente r 's mission is a more
narrow one. Our limited resources are supposed to be devoted to
addressing discrete legal problems of identifiable individuals , not
to engage in p ro-active rights-oriented litigation . V.Je leave those
issues for organ izations Eke the ACLU."
"'.l can unoe
, rstan d your concern wlt
. h, startmg
.
'
l
,-1"
down
tnat
roa ....
,
I acknowledged.
"But
here
vou
have
a
readilv
identifiable
class
of
I
potential plain tiffs who will benefit from your d efense of this deci·
.
~r
'
.,
' 'k o f resources necessary to aetenc!
'
s10n.
t·h.oreover,
tne
b>:..lL
t h.
.1s case
has already bee n exp e nded at the trial level. Surely defending the
decision on a ppeal will not prove overwhelmingly burdensom e?"
"N ot if that were the only prob lem," Eduardo replied. "I also
wonder if th e d ecision will stand up on appeal. The trial court
judge was a fairly liberal Carter-appointee, and I'm not sure her
reasoning will be accepted by the appellate court. If the decision
is reversed on appeal, the homeless will be worse off than if the
decision is vacated."
''You've identified a valid concern. An adverse appellate court
decision is likely to be quite damaging to your cause. In addition
to its greater visibility and credibility, it will have greater
precedential value , making it difficult for tenants who did not
participate in the original case to raise similar challenges on their
own."
"Isn't it unfair for the government to force me into this position?" Eduardo questioned.
"\f/ell, as you've admitted, the government can always proceed
with its appeal and seek reversal of the trial court decision on the
merits. I assume you wouldn't view that as unfair."
"No," Eduardo agreed.
"The government is simply giving you the option of avoiding
defending the decision on a ppeal. You might view the government
as doing you a favor rather than forcing you into an unfair
choice."
"So you're saying that I can't avoid vacatur unless I'm willing
to devote the resources to pursuing an a p peal that is both unnecessary and potentially d estructive to my cause."
"That's right. This appeal is unnecessary because your clients
r
,
'"
;<.
"
are no 'wnger 'no me less. I_'d rorgotten
t h at, " .!.y musea.
1t.1ayDe
you
do have an alterna tive ."
"The m o o tn ess issue," replied Eduardo, anticipating m y next
I

r

•
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thought. "I could argue that the case should be dis missed on
appeal as moot and that, under Ka rcher v. A1ay, the moo tness does
not result from happenstance but from deliberate ac tions by the
government." He began typing r2tpid ly. "If there is no settlement
agreeme nt, Nestle tec hnically isn't controlling, and the court would· vacace
, . .I tnnH<
' . ' . we may .h ave some th'
n , t 'oe compe 11·ea' w
1 1ng 'nere ."
"The government is likely to respond with the same argu. rna d e .m vD onner inat<,
" ' ' 11" .
"Th
me nts 1t
! warneG., 'mm.
· e government
h as typically tal'en the position th;:rt -.;acatur is generally appro priate when a case becomes moot p end ing a ppeal, cHmg
J\1unsingwear. 153 According to the government, this is true even if
.r
' · o:,r tn.e
1
•
, 154
t h.e mootness resu l ts .,rom
tJh e conGEC[
part1es.
"That reminds me, you said ::v:o Justices had dissented from
the dismissal in Kaisha, but you never told me what they decided ,"
Edu ardo remembered. "Did they reach the merits? Is there anything in that opinion that I can use to o ppose vacatur in this
case?"
"I suppose I d id n't think the d issent's view of the merits in
Kaisha was too important. It's only the view of two Justices, a nd
one of them, J ustice Blackmun, is no longer on the Court."
"Where the standard set by the Supreme Court is unclear, the
opinion of even a single Justice can bind the lower courts,"
Eduardo explained. "Remember the Third Circuit opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casry? 155 T he court, in a fascinating analysis
of the stare d ecisis effe ct o f p lurality and splintered opinions, concluded it was obligated to foliow th e reasoning of J ustice
O'Connor in the recent abortion cases, 156 because her o pinion
provided the narrowest grounds n ecessary to secure a majority o f
the Court." 157
"True, but Justice O'Connor was part of the majority in the

153 See U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha, st~pra note 89 , a t 9.
154 !d. at 12-13.
155 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
!56 E.g., Hodgson v. MinnesoL'l., 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (O'Co nn or, J., concurring);
Webster v. Rep roducti\'e Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, j.. concurring).
157 See Planned Parenlhood, 947 F.2d at 692-94 (describing p roced ure for ide ntifying
precedent from plurality and spl intered Su preme Court opinions ); id. a t 719 (concluding
that j lis ti ce O'Connor' s standard represe nted the narrowest grounds in the majori ty a nd
is therefo re "at present the law of th e lan d"); Bium v. \\'i tco Chem. Co rp., 888 F.2d 975,
981 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Although th e re is some awkward n ess in attribu ti ng preccdential
value to an opinion of one Suprem e Co urt justice to which no oth er justi ce adhered, it
is th e usua l practice when tha t is th e deierm inative op in ion . . .. ").
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abortion cases," I responded . "The key to that reasoning is that a
single Justice may issue the determinative opinion in a case, but
only where he or she joins in the judgment. Justice Stevens' opinion in Kaisha is a dissent."
"But, because the m ajority didn't reach the merits, Justice
. .
. ' t a rea,l d.1ssent. ,,
1sn
Stevens ' opmwn
"Well, for whatever it's worth, Justice Stevens did reach the
merits in Kaisha. He concluded that the Federal C ircuit's practice
of routi nely granting the :parries' motions to vacate seuled cases
1Nas obi
ectionable an.:::l ino:on:oooriate ."158
J
"Did he base his decision on the policy consideratio ns we've
d iscussed?" Eduardo asked.
"His discussion of the merits was only two paragraphs long," I
said, "but it incorporated a number of the factors we talked about.
Essen tially, he came out against routine vacatur for two reasons .
First, he said that the discre tion of th e court to vacate a judgment
should only be exercised if vacatur would serve the public interest."
"Implicitly rejecting the notion that the judgment is the private property of the litigants, to dispose of as they will?" Eduardo
inteijected.
'justice Stevens explicitly stated that precedents are not the
property of private litigants. He we nt on to reject the argument
that a policy of routine vacatur will encourage settlement, finding
that although the availability of vacatur might affect the terms of
some settlements, it was unlikely to affect the number of cases
settled. He also observed , as you did, th a t the settlement through
vacatur re presents a false economy if subsequent courts have to
relitigate previously decided issues."159
"Did Justice Stevens articulate standard s for the lower courts
to apply in ruling on a motion to vacate?" Eduardo asked .
"He didn't se t forth any precise formula, but he did rej ect the
policy of routinely granting motions to vacate. The o pinion concludes with the point that the 'public interest in preserving the
work product of the judicial system sh ould always at least be
weighed in the balance before such a motion is granted. " >1 60
"It sounds as if at least one Justice is convinced that routine
~ ·

.l

.!.

l.

158 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabush iki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., ! 14 S. Ct.
425, 431 (1993) (Stevens, J., d issen ti ng).
159 !d. at 431-32.
160 !d. at 432.

366

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2

vacatur is contrary to the public interest," Eduardo speculated.
"Nonetheless, I don 't see how his opinion can be binding on lower
courts," I said, "although I admit that the Second Circuit seemed to be
strongly influenced by it in its recent decision m Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas." 161
"So there have been lower court decisions on vacatur smce
Kaisha?"
"Yes. Manufacturers Hanover was, I believe, the first case to
address post-settlement vacatur after the Ka islw decision. In Manufacturers Hanover, the litigants settled their case after the Second Circuit
had filed its opinion and then jointly moved for vacatur." 16 ~
"I thou ght the Second Circuit routinely granted such requests in
the interest of encouraging settlement," Eduardo said.
"The court distinguished Nestle on the basis that Nestle involved
vacatur of a district court decision. 163 The public interest in favor of
preserving the decision is greater, the court said , when a judgment has
received appellate scrutiny."
"I can see a basis for distinguishing between vacatur of a district
court decision and an appellate judgment, but I'm not sure the difference is all that great," Eduardo reflected.
"That's why the Manufacturers Hanover opinion is interesting. In
addition to adopting a different rule for motions to vacate appellate
decisions, the Second Circuit took the opportunity to expound on the
public interests inherent in a judicial decision and the destructive effect
of vacatur on those interests, citing Justice Stevens' dissent in
Kaisha. 164 Although it didn't overrule Nestle, the court's approach in
Manufacturers Hanover was almost the direct opposite."
"That suggests there's hope for me to get a dismissal without
vacatur in my case after all," Eduardo said eagerly . "Maybe the tide is
turning even in the Second Circuit, and courts will be amenable to my
argument that mootness doesn't require vacatur of the district court
opinion."
"Given the Second Circuit's reliance on Justice Stevens' opinion in

161 II F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993).
162 The settlement was reached prior to the issuance of the mandate; therefore, the court
still had jurisdiction. !d. at 382.
163 !d. at 384.
164 See id. at 384 (citing Kaisha, l 14 S. Ct. at 43! (Stevens, J., dissenti ng)) (arguing that
allowing party with deep pocket to buy its way out of a precede nt is improper use of judicial
syste m); id. at 385 (citing Kaisha , 114 S. Ct. at 431 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (conc luding that
public interest in judicial decision may outweigh interest in promoting settlement); id. (citing
Kaisha , 11 4 S. Ct. at 431-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (acknowledgi ng that prom ise of judicial
economy provided by routine vacatur may be illusory, again citing Justice Stevens' dissent).
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Kaisha, it may also consider his specific rejection of the government's
argument that mootness automatically compels vacatur. 165 Justice
Stevens distinguished Kaisha from Munsingwear and concluded that the
principles justifying vacatur upon mootness do not apply when the
mootness is ' achieved by purchase. '" 166
"T hat reason ing could be important when the Court decides
Bonner Mall," Eduardo observed. "Well, you've given me plenty to
work with. What time did you say your class was?"
"It started two minutes ago," I realized, looking at my watch. I
franticaliy began to scour the office for my class notes , casebook, etc.
\Vhen I looked up, Eduardo was gone.
POSTSCRIPT

Eduardo vanished as completely as a vacated decisio11. Refl ecting
later on our conversation, I thought about his characterization of routine
vacatur as manipulation of the judicial system. I wondered if his distaste for judicial sanction of a system in which the litigants can buy
and sell precedents was a function of his ideological views. And I
wondered whether, if it reached the issue, the Supreme Court would
view it with similar concern.

165 The Second Ciicuit stated that ivlunsingwear did not compel vacatur even of district
court judgments when a case is settled pending appeal and characterized its holding in Nes tle
as an exercise of discretion. II F.3d at 384.
166 Kaisha, !14 S. Ct. at 431.

